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This paper calls into question the Canadian government’s complicity in resource 
colonialism in Guatemala by way of failing to effectively regulate the operations of Canadian 
mining companies.  These companies repeatedly ignore their responsibilities as duty bearers to 
effectively engage in consultations of good faith with communities in a way that protects, 
respects and fulfills their right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent as outlined in various 
international human rights frameworks.  In view of this, the principle purpose of this thesis is to 
assess the potential viability of human-rights impact assessments (HRIAs) in facilitating the 
operationalization of FPIC processes and safeguarding the human rights entitlements of local 
Indigenous rights-holders who stand to be affected by a particular mining project, policy or 
practice.   By juxtaposing the strengths and shortcomings of collaborative and community-
based HRIAs, this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the utility and viability of 
HRIAs as an authoritative human rights due diligence mechanism.   This thesis uses a 
multidisciplinary methodological approach which relied primarily on qualitative research by 
way of testimonios provided by mining-affected people in predominately Indigenous 
communities throughout Guatemala.  One of the key findings of this research is that 
community participation and ownership over the HRIA is critical, as involvement of right-
holders helps to ensure that human rights analysis throughout the assessment process reflects 
and is responsive to the demands of Indigenous Peoples, helping to preserve procedural 
integrity in contrast to other HRIA processes where communities play a less significant role, 
ultimately leading to more optimal outcomes with respect to the protection and promotion of 
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“There’s really no such thing as the ‘voiceless’.  There are only the deliberately 
silenced, or the preferably unheard.” 
--- Arundhati Roy 
 
 
For those whose voices have been smothered by the weight of a viscerally perverse 
and unjust world.   
 
 
“All these things we have to do – pick up the bodies of our loved ones, of wounded people and 
get them on a motorcycle, people have been tear gassed, children have been tear gassed – this 
is how we live. Thank you for coming, but learn this stuff. This is the reality. Hopefully it sinks 
into your heart and into your conscience. This is how things work. Join together with other 
people and amongst each other, become activists, work together for our common humanity. 
Only if we work together for our common humanity will these foreign companies stop coming in 
here and treating us like the way they do.” 
 
Testimonio from Maria Choc, a Q’eqchi community leader and human and lands-rights 
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 6 
Introduction: Canadian Mining and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) 
 
 
Despite Indigenous peoples only accounting for five per cent of the earth’s population, it 
is estimated that over half of the world’s remaining mineral resources lay beneath lands and 
territories they inhabit.1  The presence of such immense natural wealth on Indigenous territory 
has subsequently brought many of the world’s indigenous communities in direct conflict with 
foreign investors looking to exploit and expropriate their lands and resources.  Seeing that 
many Indigenous territories are governed using a system of collective land tenure rights, a 
system which is often not recognized as being legitimate by State governments, foreign 
investors are often able to engage in large-scale land acquisitions that flagrantly disregard 
customary Indigenous ownership of the land.  This, in part, can be attributed to the fact that in 
many countries the State maintains ownership over subsurface mineral rights regardless of pre-
existing surface, often collective land tenure rights.  By means of this prevailing code of 
practice, mining companies are able to secure mineral concessions from national governments 
who often act as a spokesperson for local communities despite neither being commissioned nor 
authorized by indigenous communities to do so.  The failure of the national government to 
ensure the meaningful participation of communities affected by a proposed mining project has 
spurred anti-mining movements across Latin America, particularly in Central America.   
In Guatemala, the pervasiveness of Canadian mining companies has produced a nation-
wide movement of resistance, predominantly led by the country’s Indigenous populace. Many 
of these companies have been negligent in failing to recognize their obligations as duty bearers, 
                                                      
1 Doyle, Cathal M. Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative role of free prior 
and informed consent. New York: Routledge, 2015. Page 5. 
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often failing to exercise a duty of care by conducting adequate human rights due diligence 
processes including meaningfully engaging with local Indigenous communities in a way that 
respects their right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).  Such omissions on the part of 
Canadian mining companies has precipitated a mass-mobilization of the country’s Maya 
communities to unite behind the common purpose of rejecting mining on their ancestral lands 
and territories.  Such resistance to Canadian mining companies has manifested itself primarily 
through public protests, blockades and consultas communitarias (consultas), which are 
municipal plebiscites used to determine community perspectives surrounding mining activities.  
The prevalence of consultas across Guatemala arguably implies a failure by Canadian mining 
companies to uphold their corporate responsibility to respect human rights by conducting 
adequate human rights due diligence processes, specifically their legal duty to effectively 
consult communities who stand to be impacted by a particular policy, project or practice as 
advised in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPS).2 
As the global standard for promoting respect for human rights in business, the UNGPs 
outlines a four-step process for business enterprises to conduct human rights due diligence.  
First, the establishment of a corporate human rights policy which outlines a commitment 
towards meeting their responsibility to respect human rights.  Second, conducting human rights 
risk/impact assessments as a way to identify, prevent and mitigate their impacts on human 
rights.  Third, the integration of assessment procedures into corporate governance structures 
and fourth, iteratively tracking and reporting the effectiveness of the human rights assessment 
                                                      
2 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights . (2011). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework. United Nations, Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights. New York: United Nations. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf 
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process.  In that regard, Human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) are an emerging human 
rights due diligence tool which offer companies a proactive way to translate the policies 
enshrined in the UNGPs into corporate practice.  On the other hand, HRIAs provide Indigenous 
communities with a substantive means by which to proclaim and assert their collective land 
tenure and resource rights in a way that is in accordance with their customary laws and 
practices. Whereas other conventional impact assessment procedures such as social or 
environmental impact assessments view risk primarily from a company perspective by which 
adverse human rights impacts are surveyed in relation to the reputational, operational, legal 
and financial costs that they pose to a company’s bottom line, HRIAs in contrast examine and 
emphasize the ways in which human rights risks affect rights-holders, for instance local 
indigenous communities.   
In light of this, this paper hopes to call attention to the various ways in which Canadian 
mining companies in Guatemala are failing to fulfill their human rights obligations by neglecting 
to conduct crucial due diligence processes despite them being a core requirement of their role 
as duty bearers under international human rights law.  Following from this, the paper argues 
that mining companies can contribute to the operationalization of human rights in the regions 
in which they operate by incorporating human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) into their 
corporate accountability, social responsibility and risk management strategies.  Recognizing the 
principal role that respecting the right of Indigenous Peoples to FPIC processes ought to play in 
each of these businesses components, the central question that then frames this paper is what 
impact, if any, can HRIAs have on operationalizing FPIC processes to promote self-determined 
development?  Could the institutionalization of HRIAs -- particularly ones that are collaborative 
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or community based -- as a mandatory human rights due diligence requirement (similar to 
Environmental Impact Assessments) for Canadian mining companies be an appropriate 
procedure to facilitate both effective and meaningful stakeholder engagement in a way that 
reflects and realizes the principles upon which FPIC is based: transparency, agency, 
participation, proactivity and self-determination.   The principal purpose of this paper is to 
assess the potential relevance of HRIAs to the operationalization of FPIC processes.  In doing so, 
this article hopes to contribute to the existing literature on HRIAs by highlighting how the right 
of Indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed consent can be advanced through 
collaborative or community-based HRIAs, a topic which to the author’s knowledge has yet to be 
explored.    
Finally, the central argument that frames this paper is that HRIAs, when conducted in 
accordance with local indigenous customary laws and practices offer Indigenous peoples a 
formidable mechanism through which to proclaim and protect their non-derogable subsistence 
and existence rights particularly those pertaining to the protection of their customary land and 
resource tenure systems.  By the same token, it will be argued that community-based HRIAs 
which adhere to local cultural and consultative processes and are free from any external 
influence, interference and intimidation will help to empower Indigenous peoples with a 
substantive methodology by which to safeguard their right to FPIC as enshrined in the 
international human rights regime.  Considering that in countries such as Guatemala, where the 
national government reserves the right to subsurface resources regardless of customary 
indigenous land tenure systems on the surface, this thesis contends that community-led HRIAs 
allow Indigenous peoples to harness international legal accords in which FPIC is enshrined such 
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as ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP in their defense against the state-sanctioned 
appropriation of their lands, territories and resources. 
 
 




This article used a multidisciplinary methodological approach that focused primarily on 
document analysis and qualitative research through testimonios conducted in mining-affected 
communities adjacent to Canadian mining operations in Guatemala.  A comprehensive review 
of the principal literature on business and human rights was undertaken in order to provide a 
broad overview of the state of art as it pertains to the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights through human rights due diligence procedures.  That being said, various reports 
on processes related to human rights due diligence were surveyed with a particular focus on 
contemporary tools used to conduct human rights impact assessments and subsequent 
literature examining their efficacy.  The various primary source documents that were reviewed 
include: the World Bank’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s Assessment of the Marlin Mining 
Project in Guatemala reviewed in conjunction with a Human Rights Assessment of Goldcorp’s 
Marlin Mine conducted by On Common Ground Consultants.  Relatedly, the article reviewed 
key publications pertaining to HRIAs including Oxfam and Rights and Democracy’s Getting it 
Right: Human Rights Impact Assessment Guide,” the Danish Institute for Human Rights Human 
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Rights Impact Assessment Guidance and Toolbox3, a joint report published by the Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment as well as the Danish Institute for Human Rights and 
SciencePo Law School report titled, “A Collaborative Approach to Human Rights Impact 
Assessments,” among others.  
Further, the scope of this article’s research was narrowed to the Guatemalan context for 
three reasons. The author’s initial research interests sought to examine ways in which the 
human rights violations of Indigenous peoples could be prevented by enforcing respect for FPIC 
by Canadian mining companies.  In light of this, a preliminary review of the most-recent 
business and human rights literature revealed that HRIAs, particularly collaborative HRIAs, offer 
corporations a potential mechanism for undertaking human rights due diligence in a way that 
effectuates the UNGPs and to a certain extent the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).  In view of the high concentration of Canadian mining companies 
in Guatemala, coupled with the fact that country is preponderantly Indigenous, Guatemala 
seemed like an ideal reference point from which to examine how the human rights due 
diligence processes of Canadian mining companies can potentially be improved through HRIAs.   
Secondly, of the remarkably few HRIAs publicized by a mining company, one was completed at 
a Canadian mining company’s operations in Guatemala and therefore provided substantial 
literature which could be critically scrutinized.  Lastly, the author tailored the scope of this 
article’s research to the Guatemalan context upon learning that he would be participating in a 
field school to Guatemala whereby mining-affected Indigenous communities could be 
interviewed. 
                                                      
3 The Danish Insitute for Human Rights. Human Rights Impact Assessment - Guidance and Toolbox. Copenhagen: 
The Danish Institute for Human Rights , 2016. 
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The field-school was led by Catherine Nolin, a geographer from the University of 
Northern British Columbia and Grahame Russel, a non-practicing Canadian lawyer who founded 
RightsAction, a Toronto-based non-profit organization which, “funds grassroots human rights, 
environmental and development organizations in Guatemala and Honduras.”4  RightsAction, as 
stated on the organization’s website works to; “build north-south relationships and support 
education, legal work and activism to hold accountable the U.S. and Canadian governments, 
our companies and investors that oftentimes cause and profit from exploitation and poverty, 
environmental destruction, repression and violence, corruption and impunity in Honduras and 
Guatemala, and beyond.”5  Both Nolin and Russel have worked in Guatemala on academic and 
solidarity work for the past four decades and have therefore built-up respectable rapport with 
indigenous communities combating oppression inflicted by Canadian mining companies. Such 
connections allowed for introductions to communities and human and environmental 
organizations in a manner that respected their safety as well as agency and autonomy.  
Therefore, participating in the field-school seemed like a non-invasive way to garner 
information from mining-affected communities considering the attendant time-constraints 
associated with the requirements of this thesis.  That being said, ethics-review approval was 
granted by the University of Northern British Columbia. 
This thesis used a methodological approach which relied extensively on personal 
testimonios provided by mining-affected people in indigenous communities throughout 
Guatemala.  Embraced by activist researchers, testimonios allow for the amplification of 
marginalized voices in academic discourse and beyond.  These voices from the margins often 
                                                      
4 RightsAction. About US. n.d. 10 June 2018. <http://rightsaction.org/about-us/>. 
5 Ibid. 
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speak of collective rather than individual experience and do so in relation to what Nolin and 
Shankar (2000) describe as “the systems or situations that have historically suppressed the 
ability to speak.”6  In outlining how testimonios differ from autobiography, Nolin and Shankar 
cite the work of Beverely (1998) and Gelles (1998) which is worth quoting at length.  
Testimonio is a form of collective autobiographical witnessing that gives voice to 
oppressed peoples and has played an important role in developing and supporting 
international human rights, solidarity movements and liberation struggles … such 
a narrative is always linked to a group or class situation marked by 
marginalization, oppression and struggle, the loss of which moves the piece from 
testimonio to autobiography.  (Geller, 1998, p.3) 
 
That being said, reliance of this research on the use of testimonios was done in order to 
provide a highly sensitive space through which previously silenced mining-affected 
individuals could speak their truth by giving voice to the various human rights violations 
and injustices that they have endured.  In this respect, testimonios offer a perceptive 
platform for victims of mining-abuses to recount how such abuses has impacted them 
individually, but also collectively.  Given the vulnerability of the Maya in Guatemala with 
regard to state-sanctioned violence against them, historically and currently coupled with 
extreme oppression inflicted by foreign mining companies, every-effort was made to 
uphold the highest standard of ethical research practices and the utmost sensitivity 
during the process of receiving testimonios.  Testimonios were received by the author 
during May 2018 in four mining-affected communities across Guatemala where Canadian 
mining companies have been granted concessions.  Testomonios were facilitated by 
                                                      
6 Hanlon, Catherine Nolin and Finola Shankar. "Gendered Spaces of Terror and Assault: The Testimonio of REMHI 
and the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala." Gender, Place and Culture 7.3 (2000): 265-
286. 
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Grahame Russel and Catherine Nolin and conducted in Spanish and Mayan Q’eqchi’ with 
the former being translated by Russel and the latter with the help of Joseph Ich.   
 Moreover, before this article begins, it is important that several key terms be 
defined so as to provide some conceptual clarification in the hopes of preventing 
potential misunderstanding surrounding nomenclature.  The article uses the term 
“project-affected people”, “local communities” and “indigenous peoples” almost 
interchangeably.  The reason for this is that, in the context of Guatemala’s mining sector, 
project-affected people and local communities in the regions in which mining companies 
operate overwhelmingly self-identify as indigenous. This article also uses the UN Guiding 
Principles Reporting Framework’s definition of human rights due diligence which it 
defines as: “An ongoing risk management process…in order to identify, prevent, mitigate 
and account for how [a company] addresses its adverse human rights impacts.  It includes 
four key steps: assessing actual and potential human rights impacts; integrating and 
acting on the findings; tracking responses; and communicating about how impacts are 
addressed.”7 This article is particularly interested in the initial assessment procedures of 
human rights due diligence processes known as human rights impact assessments 
(HRIAs).  
This article’s definition of an HRIA echoes that of The Danish Institute for Human 
Rights which describes an HRIA “as a process for identifying, understanding, assessing and 
addressing the adverse effects of a business project or activities on the human rights 
                                                      
7 Shift and Mazars LLP. UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework with implementation guidance. Mazars LLP. 
New York City: Shift and Mazars LLP, 2015. Page 110.   
 15 
enjoyment of impacted rights-holders such as workers and community members.”8 
Building on this definition, the article understands HRIAs to be a process that prioritizes 
risks to rights holders (in this case local indigenous peoples) ahead of corporate business 
risks; gives precedence to community perspectives regarding the design and 
implementation of the assessment process and finally is a process that is deeply imbued 
with the very human rights principles that HRIAs seek to promote that is, transparency, 
equality, participation and non-discrimination.  Lastly, this article refers to FPIC processes 
as procedures which exhibit respect for indigenous self-determination over their 
ancestral lands, territories and natural resources.  It will be argued that ex-ante HRIAs 
offer a formidable tool to advance respect for the right of Indigenous peoples to free, 
prior and informed consent in the mining sector. 
 Finally, the article seeks to analyze how HRIAs can support the operationalization 
of FPIC as ensconced in international human rights frameworks such as the UNDRIP in the 
hopes of advancing Indigenous peoples rights over their lands and resources. It is 
important to point out however, that respecting the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC is 
as much about process as it is about outcome.  As RESOLVE underscores in a recent 
report, FPIC is considered to be a mechanism, “that safeguards the individual and 
collective rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, including their land and resource rights 
and their right to self-determination.  This means that neither consultation nor consent 
can be viewed as outcomes in and of themselves, nor can consultation and consent be 
                                                      
8 The Danish Insitute for Human Rights. Human Rights Impact Assessment - Guidance and Toolbox. Copenhagen: 
The Danish Institute for Human Rights , 2016. Page 9. 
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seen as stand-alone rights.”9  The report goes on to add that “While negotiation of FPIC 
provides a means for indigenous and tribal peoples to exercise their human rights, it does 
not represent the full scope of those rights.”10 This interpretation of FPIC is particularly 
important for this research as it highlights that the concept of FPIC is just one tool to 
safeguard indigenous peoples’ individual and collective rights, including their rights over 
traditionally used and occupied lands and resources, and therefore FPIC should be viewed 
as a framework through which to recognize and respect those rights. 
 
MINING INDUSTRIES AND THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ TO FREE, PRIOR 
AND INFORMED CONSENT  
 
 
By its very nature, resource extraction is inherently disruptive, environmentally and – 
increasingly when it comes to resources located on Indigenous peoples’ traditional lands and 
territories – socially and culturally.  The dominant paradigm of resource extraction often does 
not consider a culturally sensitive and human-rights based approach to development.  As such, 
resource extraction processes in general, and mining activities in particular, often inhibit 
indigenous peoples from accessing their lands and natural resources or degrade or destroy land 
of prime agricultural and cultural significance thereby directly impacting their physical well-
being and the integrity of their cultures and livelihoods.  In his final report to the United 
                                                      
9 Anaya, J.S., Evans, J. and D. Kemp (2017) Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) within a human rights 
framework: Lessons from a Suriname case study. RESOLVE FPIC Solutions Dialogue: Washington DC. Preface, Page 
ii.  
10 Ibid. Page 4 
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Nation’s Human Rights Council the former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, James Anaya, in support of this writes that, “The business model that still prevails in 
most places for the extraction of natural resources within indigenous territories is not one that 
is fully conducive to the fulfillment of indigenous peoples’ rights, particularly their self-
determination, proprietary and cultural rights in relation to their affected lands and 
resources.”11  Anaya is putting things lightly when he states that the operations of extractive 
industries are not “fully conducive” to indigenous rights considering that it would not be an 
overstatement to suggest that extractive industries in general and mining companies in 
particular are overwhelmingly responsible for the contravention of the rights of indigenous 
peoples worldwide.   
A common thread running through the majority of these violations however is the 
repeated disrespect of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination of which FPIC is one 
expression.  FPIC is a decision-making process whereby indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination is respected through their participation and consultation in decisions that 
directly affect them, typically regarding development and extractive projects.   The UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) Report of the International Workshop on 
Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples sought to 
“develop realistic and concise methodologies on how the principle of free, prior and informed 
consent should be respected in activities relating to indigenous peoples.”12  According to the 
                                                      
11 Anaya, J. (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya Extractive 




report, at the heart of efforts to mainstream FPIC is an understanding that indigenous peoples 
should be free to reach their own decisions and not be coerced, intimidated or manipulated. 
Decisively the report outlines that Prior “Should imply that consent has been sought sufficiently 
in advance of any authorization or commencement of activities and that respect is shown for 
time requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus processes.” Importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, the UNPFII’s definition of Informed is worth quoting at length seeing 
that indigenous communities adjacent to mining companies are rarely instructed on the various 
ways in which mining can impact their lives and livelihoods.   
Informed should imply that information is provided that covers (at least) the 
following aspects:  
a) The nature size, pace, reversibility and scope of any proposed project or 
activity; 
b) The reason(s) for or purpose(s) of the project and/or activity; 
c) The duration of the above;  
d) The locality of areas that will be affected;  
e) A preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and 
environmental impact, including potential risks and fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing in a context that respects the precautionary principle; 
f) Personnel likely to be involved in the execution of the proposed project 
(including indigenous peoples, private sector staff, research institutions, 
government employees and others);  
g) Procedures that the project may entail. 
 
Lastly, the report underscores that consent has to be granted by indigenous peoples in a 
manner that reflects their interpretation to the agreement.  In addition to defining the principle 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Report of the International Workshop on Methodolgies regarding Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples. United Nations Economic and Social Council . New 





of FPIC, the UNPFII’s report also makes a series of important recommendations pertaining to 
the operationalization of the principle, specifically in relation to impact assessment processes.  
The report highlights that FPIC is particularly relevant “In relation to development projects 
encompassing the full project cycle, including but not limited to assessment (emphasis added), 
planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and closure, whether the projects are 
directed towards indigenous communities, or while not directed towards them, may affect or 
impact upon them.” Moreover, the report also maintains that the operationalization of FPIC is 
pertinent “in relation to United Nations organizations and other intergovernmental 
organizations that undertake studies on the impact of projects to be implemented in 
indigenous peoples’ territories.”   
 The failure of Canadian mining companies to respect the right of Indigenous peoples to 
FPIC frequently results in a number of serious human rights implications directly associated 
with natural resource extraction operations. A number of scholars have framed the 
unwillingness of transnational mining corporations to show regard for Indigenous land 
ownership and their economic and social systems as resource colonialism or “accumulation by 
dispossession.”13  In terms of the former, Caxaj et al write that “The dynamics of colonial 
appropriation and racist ideology in conjunction with economic models of wealth accumulation 
have been referred to as resource colonialism,” later adding that “Resource colonialism 
requires ignoring land ownership and other distinct rights through the legal/political 
                                                      
13 Caxaj, C. Susana, et al. "Promises of Peace and Development - Mining and Violence in Guatemala." Advances in 
Nursing Science 36.3 (2013): 213-228. Page 215. 
Harvey, David. "The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation By Dispossession ." Socialist Register 40 (2004). 
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construction of Indigenous communities as dependent domestics (wards of the state).”14 
Similarly, the experience of Canadian mining companies in violating the rights of Indigenous 
peoples in Guatemala buttress David Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession which 
serves as an evaluative expansion of Marx’s writings on primitive accumulation.  Harvey 
describes his theory of accumulation by dispossession in relation to Marx’s concept of primitive 
accumulation in a Brief History of Neoliberalism, which is worth quoting at length:  
By this I mean the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices which 
Marx had treated of as “primitive” or “original” during the rise of capitalism.  These 
include the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of 
peasant populations [....] Conversion of various forms of property rights (common, 
collective, state, etc) into private property rights; suppression of rights to the 
commons; commodification of labour and power and the suppression of alternative 
(indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neocolonial, and 
imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); 
monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade (which 
continues particularly in the sex industry); and usury, the national debt and, most 
devastating of all, the use of the credit system as a radical means of accumulation 
by dispossession.15 
 
It is this theoretical backdrop which underpins the raison d’être of this article.  The persistent  
failure of Canadian mining companies operating in Guatemala (and across the globe) to respect 
the right of Indigenous peoples to FPIC can only be viewed as a continuation of colonial 
dispossession and appropriation.  This is indicative by the fact that Canadian mining companies 
have been implicated in crimes such as forced displacement, the assassination of indigenous 
human rights defenders, gang rapes of Indigenous women by mine security personnel and the 
deliberate desecration of indigenous ancestral lands and sacred sites all of which have been 
                                                      
14 Caxaj, C. Susana, et al. "Promises of Peace and Development - Mining and Violence in Guatemala." Advances in 
Nursing Science 36.3 (2013): 213-228. Page 215. 
15 Harvey, David. "The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation By Dispossession ." Socialist Register 40 (2004). 
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committed with near perfect impunity and underscore the neocolonial tactics such 
corporations employ to further their objectives.   
Although a comprehensive report regarding the various ways in which disregard for FPIC 
often leads to egregious violations of human rights of Indigenous peoples is beyond the scope 
of this article, the right of Indigenous peoples to FPIC, as codified in international human rights 
law, can be interpreted as sanctioning respect for Indigenous self-determination so as to 
prevent further human rights violations stemming from the non-observance of FPIC.  As the 
following sections will illustrate, the right of Indigenous Peoples to FPIC is firmly ensconced in 
international human rights law, therefore any disregard for the concept as such is a failure of 
mining corporations to uphold their obligations as duty bearers under international human 
rights law, specifically as it pertains to the rights of Indigenous peoples.  Before I outline how 
FPIC is grounded in International law, I will first provide some historical background regarding 
how Canadian mining companies have violated the right of Indigenous peoples to FPIC in the 
various regions throughout Guatemala where they operate and recount how such violations of 
human rights has spurred an Indigenous resistance movement to the influx of foreign mining 
capital in the country.   
 
INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO CANADIAN MINING COMPANIES IN GUATEMALA 
 
 
In Latin America, Canadian mining companies dominate the regional mining sector 
amassing huge profits at the expense of Indigenous peoples’ rights and the environment.   
Roughly 50-70% of mining projects in Latin American are being orchestrated by Canadian 
 22 
companies.16  Despite pledges of sustainable development, job creation and promises to 
engage in consultations with local communities, the arrival of Canadian mining companies are 
often viewed as harbingers of environmental destruction and signal a continuation of colonial 
tactics namely the use of violence and oppression to secure the illegal expropriation of natural 
resources using all means necessary and the denial of indigenous self-determination.  Further, 
antagonistic sentiments of Canadian mining companies by local indigenous communities often 
stem from the failure of these companies to respect their right to FPIC and thus include them in 
various decision-making processes which often results in the direct imposition of neoliberal 
developments projects despite clear community opposition to such projects.    
Failure to receive the consent of local indigenous communities and respect their right to 
self-determination has induced conflict and in turn resulted in egregious violations of human 
rights. Between 2000 and 2015, 28 Canadian mining companies have been in involved in 
conflicts resulting in 44 recorded deaths in Latin America alone.17  The deaths of anti-mining 
activists, the environmental destruction and the outright dismissal of Indigenous peoples’ rights 
by Canadian mining companies has also engendered a mass mobilization of indigenous 
organizations looking to assert their citizenship rights.  The following section will examine how 
the presence of Canadian mining companies in Guatemala has led to the burgeoning of anti-
mining Indigenous movements in the country as an effect of the various ways in which such 
companies adversely impact human rights.   
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The oppression, political marginalization and mass, reoccurring violations of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights is as much a feature of Guatemala’s contemporary history as it is its past. 
Internal conflict erupted in Guatemala in 1960 and continued for a period of 36 years with 
peace accords eventually being signed in December of 1996.  During the course of the conflict, 
an estimated 300,000 people were displaced and 200,000 are believed to have been murdered 
or disappeared.  Of those killed, 83% were Mayan Indigenous peoples, leading many human 
rights defenders to accuse the country of state-sanctioned genocide.18  It is against this 
historical backdrop that Indigenous peoples within Guatemala have rejected the militarization 
of mining concessions and the continued denial of their land tenure rights and oppression by 
both transnational foreign mining companies and the national government.    
Following the cessation of conflict in 1996, Guatemala rewrote its mining law, removing 
many of its social safeguards to reflect neoliberal reforms being promoted by international 
finance institutions in an effort to entice foreign investment.  Among the reforms was the 
removal of restriction on foreign ownership, the establishment of several tax-exemptions for 
mining companies, and a reduction of the royalty rate from 6 to 1%.19  Even more outrageous 
was the liberalization of stipulations surrounding environmental and social impact assessments 
(ESIA) which as the term suggests, refers to a process to predict potential environmental and 
social impacts of a proposed project in the hopes of preventing adverse impacts.  This is 
achieved through designing appropriate risk mitigation, management and monitoring measures 
as a way to maximize benefits.  Following the mining legislation reforms, updated provisions 
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stipulated that if Guatemala’s National Commission on the Environment was unable to review 
ESIAs -- which can be “hundreds and hundreds of pages long” -- submitted by mining 
companies within a period of 30 days, then the proposed project is to be granted automatic 
approval.20  The revised law also ignores specifications that incorporate the inclusion of 
indigenous communities in decision-making processes involving development projects in their 
territories despite such provisions being outlined in ILO Convention 169, which Guatemala 
ratified in June 1996.    
According to Gordon and Webber, it was Canadian mining company Goldcorp that led 
the re-emergence of large-scale industrial mining in the country subsequently initiating a rush 
for the country’s natural resource wealth.21  Located in Guatemala’s western highlands 
Goldcorp’s Marlin gold mine was the first mining project constructed following the 1996 peace 
accords.   Following the approval of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment in 
November 2003, Glamis Gold (who owned the mine at the time) began construction of the 
mine’s facilities with production eventually beginning in the third quarter of 2005.22  The Marlin 
mine is spread across two municipalities: San Miguel Ixztahuacan and Sipacaca both of which 
are home to two distinct indigenous communities.  The former hosts 87% of Marlin’s operation 
and is home to the Mam Mayan and the latter to the Sipakapense Mayan with the remaining 
13% of the operation being located on their ancestral territory.   
Since the inception of the Goldcorp’s operation, mining has rapidly proliferated in 
Guatemala.  Today, according to recent figures published by Guatemala’s Ministry of Energy 
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and Minerals, there are an estimated 307 active mining licenses in the country, most of which 
are concentrated in rural indigenous regions.  Another 600 more are pending review by the 
Ministry.23  This rush of foreign mining companies has a long sordid history following the 
cessation of the Guatemalan Government’s genocidal campaign against the country’s 
Indigenous peoples. Sandt in his report on Mining Conflicts and Indigenous Peoples in 
Guatemala citing the Bank Information Center highlights how even as early as 2005, “ten 
percent of Guatemala [was] covered by mining license, the majority of which are held by 
foreign interests; 90% of the land covered by these licenses is in indigenous territory.24  Much 
of this activity can be attributed to the influx of Canadian mining capital to the region.  As 
Gordon and Webber note, Canada is the second largest foreign investor in Guatemala with the 
majority of the investment centered on the mining sector.25  This is supported by the fact that 
in May 2012, sixteen out of the seventeen active mining concessions in Guatemala were being 
operated by a Canadian company.26  In Latin America more broadly, 50 to 70 percent of the 
region’s mining industries are controlled by large-scale Canadian mining companies.27  
Indigenous peoples within Guatemala, whose ancestral territories is where the majority 
of the country’s natural resource wealth can be found have responded to the rush of Canadian 
mining companies by facilitating the political mobilization of indigenous organizations. The 
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objective of such organizations has been to protest the imposition of neoliberal development 
policies by specifically challenging existing mining governance structures and demanding 
greater recognition and respect for their collective rights.  The manifestation of community 
consultations or consultas comunitarias across the nation highlights both the strength and 
scope of the indigenous movement to resist foreign mining companies in Guatemala.  Although 
the numbers vary, as many as 78 Maya communities, encompassing an estimated one million 
Guatemalans have participated in community consultations as a way in which to assert their 
right to self-determination and customary ownership over their lands, territories and 
resources.28  Guatemala’s consultas movement has its origins in 2005, when the community Of 
Rio Hondo Zacapa organized a community referendum to protest the construction of a 
hydroelectric project.29   Shortly thereafter, in June of the same year, the community of 
Sipacapa also organized a consulta to resist the presence of Goldcorp in their municipality.  The 
consulta’s conclusion was that an overwhelming majority of Sipakapenses rejected the 
presence of Goldcorp’s mining operations on their territory.  The outcome of the Sipacapa 
consulta has coincided with similar community referenda across the country, the overwhelming 
majority of which have almost unanimously rejected mining and all forms of neoliberal 
development. 
As such, the establishment of these community consultations can be viewed as a way in 
which to protest the historical exclusion of indigenous voices from national and local decision-
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making processes as well as defy the attendant effects such exclusion has produced:  that is 
dispossession and displacement, economic marginalization and the unbridled violation of their 
rights as Indigenous peoples.  For many indigenous communities, as the outcome of countless 
consultas confirms, contemporary mining processes are viewed as a continuation of this 
exclusion, one which mirrors colonial tactics of appropriation and is inextricably suffused with 
racist ideology.  In light of this, the neocolonial undertones of Canadian mining companies’ 
approach to resource extraction are hard to deny when such companies consistently fail to 
uphold their international human rights obligations, specifically their responsibility as duty 
bearers to effectively engage in consultations of good faith with indigenous and local 
communities in a way that protects, respects and fulfills their right to FPIC.   
In Guatemala, Canadian mining companies have largely circumvented this obligation by 
choosing instead to deal directly with the Guatemalan national government rather than the 
communities who stand to be most-affected by the company’s operations.  In the rare 
occasions in which companies have held consultations such as the several that Goldcorp 
purportedly held in 2003, indigenous activists described the meetings more as glorified 
company promotional sessions than a space for meaningful consultation.30  Again, this 
underscores the unwillingness of Canadian mining companies to listen to indigenous 
perspectives surrounding the implementation of a proposed project and the failure of such 
companies to respect the right of indigenous peoples to autonomously manage their own 
development.    
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Much of the discourse on the nexus of indigenous rights and the impact of foreign 
mining companies in Guatemala has focused on the multi-scalar nature of Guatemala’s 
indigenous anti-mining movement and the way in which the movement has led to the 
reclamation of traditional Maya communitarian structures through the manifestation of 
consultas.   For instance, Urkidi argues that the organization of community consultations has 
resulted in a renewed sense of collective solidarity among indigenous peoples affected by the 
onslaught of foreign mining companies on their ancestral lands and territories.31  In a similar 
vein, Rasch argues that the process and outcomes produced by community consultations in 
Guatemala “demonstrate that liberal principles of political participation are not opposed to 
local, sometimes indigenous, ways of “doing politics,” but that its combination can produce 
new, hybrid forms of citizenship.”32  Rasch goes on to add that, the political processes within 
consultas have deviated from traditional forms of political participation by virtue of their 
inclusivity.33  Community organizing of consultations has transformed local citizenship by 
removing typical bureaucratic barriers to participation such as not requiring voter 
registration.34 The removal of such formalities has not only ensured that consultas reflect 
indigenous decision-making processes but has also allowed for women to be equally 
represented.35  In this sense, consultas have helped forge a sense of unity among Indigenous 
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communities by bringing people from disparate groups; indigenous peoples, ladinos, men and 
women together to oppose mining companies.36   
As Rasch and Urkidi have noted, the organization of consultas throughout Guatemala 
can be viewed as a demonstration of Indigenous Maya agency, an exercise in affirming their 
autonomy, self-determination over their ancestral lands and as a mechanism to have their 
voices heard both by the Guatemalan Government and transnational mining companies.37  In 
addition to drawing on the terminology of self-determination, Nolin’s interviews with Sipakapa 
consulta organizers revealed that the majority of interviewees regarded consultas as an 
authoritative expression of the community’s voice, with the outcome of the vote being termed 
as “our voice.”38  Despite every effort by the Guatemalan Government and transnational mining 
companies to silence and override Indigenous Maya voices, communities affected by mining 
developments continue to demand recognition for their collective rights by holding community 
consultations.   
Two years after the Sipakapa consultation was held, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court 
declared in 2007 that, although the consulta was determined to be valid under the Municipal 
Code and ILO Convention 169 although it’s outcome was to be considered non-binding. In its 
ruling the Court cited the ambiguous nature of laws and conventions used by the consulta to 
assert their rights, further stating such legal procedures were not aligned with the State’s 
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Constitution and lastly because subsurface minerals were of national public interests, they were 
under the State’s jurisdiction and therefore the community had no authority to reject extractive 
activities within their municipality.39 Regardless of such an unjust precedent, Maya 
communities have adopted a proactive approach to resisting foreign mining companies. 
According to Urkidi, more that 40 municipalities have held community consultas in 
municipalities where exploratory licenses were granted but where the prospect of potential 
mining projects was not believed to be imminent.40   
Guatemala’s anti-mining movement and the manifestation of consulta communitars 
illustrate that local Indigenous communities want a platform to express their voice in a way that 
allows them to play a meaningful role in the decision-making processes of mining projects that 
threaten to impact their ancestral lands and territories.  The assassination of environmental 
and human rights activists throughout Latin America and the violent suppression of anti-mining 
protests both show that the articulation of such views in the public domain is often met with 
fatal consequences.  As has been mentioned previously, considering that 50 – 70 percent of the 
mining activity in Latin America involves mining companies with links to Canada, the Canadian 
Government has the opportunity to play a crucial role in the regulation of corporate 
accountability as it pertains to Latin America’s mining sector.41  The widespread violation of 
indigenous rights linked to Canadian mining companies necessitates policy prescriptions that 
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advocate for preventative procedures which pressure mining corporations to fulfill their 
obligation to conduct human rights due diligence processes.  Such processes ought to recognize 
and give precedence to the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC, considering the principal role 
that compliance with FPIC processes plays in the protection and promotion of all other rights 
related to indigenous peoples.   




The right of Indigenous peoples to participate in meaningful consultation processes is 
codified in several binding and non-binding international legal frameworks including ILO 
Convention 169, the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  In the UNDRIP, the participatory rights of Indigenous 
Peoples are viewed as an explicit affirmation of the right to self-determination which is often 
framed under the umbrella term, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” or FPIC.  The standard of 
FPIC is explicitly referred to in the Declaration’s Preamble and is outlined in six provisions of the 
UNDRIP entitling indigenous people to cultural and environmental protection and safeguarding 
indigenous ownership over their lands, territories and natural resources.  The six articles in the 
UNDRIP refer to FPIC in relation to forced displacement, the right to redress, the right to FPIC as 
a prerequisite to adopting policies or procedures that may affect them including the storage or 
disposal of hazardous materials on the lands or territories of indigenous peoples or approving 
any development project that involves the utilization or exploitation of their natural resources.  
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The following section will outline, in the order that they appear, the various articles in the 
UNDRIP in which the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC is affirmed.  Moreover, in the analysis I 
will also provide a close reading which also draws from Ishita Petkar’s article on Conceptualizing 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Interpreting Interpretations of FPIC in which the author 
scrutinizes the various conceptual manifestations of FPIC “by deconstructing the language used 
in eight influential guidelines for implementing FPIC.”42 
The first mention of FPIC in the UNDRIP appears in Article 10 which specifies that 
“Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories.  No relocation 
shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples 
concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the 
option of return.”  Thus, this article explicitly prohibits state or corporate actors from forcibly 
evicting indigenous communities from their lands and territories in the pursuit of natural 
resource exploitation.  It stipulates that receiving the FPIC of communities, who stand to be 
impacted from a particular policy, project or practice, is a compulsory precondition to their 
relocation.  Anything to the contrary constitutes a violation of Indigenous peoples’ rights.  
Section 2 of Article 11 certifies that “States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, 
which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect 
to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without free, prior and 
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.” Specifically, this article 
requires that the State make every effort to provide remedy for its failure to enforce or respect 
that right of indigenous peoples to FPIC.  According to Ishita Petkar, FPIC as mentioned in 
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Article 10 functions as a safeguard and as “embodying consent itself” in so far as it offers 
protection to Indigenous communities who face relocation.”43  Petkar, in her close reading of 
Article 11 outlines that whereas Article 10 centered on FPIC as a safeguard, “Article 11 
describes FPIC as acting as an indicator of whether or not Indigenous rights to cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property have been violated.”44 Importantly, Petkar 
underscores that Article 11 is somewhat reactionary in that FPIC can be interpreted as acting as 
a “route into understanding the severity of the infractions.”45   
Articles 18 and 19 of the UNDRIP outline the right of Indigenous peoples to effective 
participation, self-determination and the operationalization of the principle of FPIC.  Although 
Article 18 does not explicitly mention the term FPIC, it underscores the right of indigenous 
peoples to be involved in the decision-making processes of planned interventions that will 
affect their lives, which is particularly relevant for the purposes of this paper. With that said, 
Article 18 affirms that, “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in 
matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in 
accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own 
indigenous decision-making institutions.”  Clearly this specific article certifies that indigenous 
peoples are entitled to participate in any decision-making process that has the potential to 
impact their rights. As well, implicit in the article’s statement is the ability of indigenous people 
to decide on their own terms how such a participatory decision-making approach would look 
like.  Perhaps most importantly, Article 18 provides indigenous peoples with complete 
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autonomy with respect to protecting and promoting their rights through institutions and 
processes of their own creation rather than those that are imposed on them.   
Article 19 proclaims that “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.”  Much the same as the articles before it, Article 
19 underscores the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination with regard to having the 
ability to directly influence authoritative-decisions that will affect them. Through the use of the 
statement through their own representative institutions, the UNDRIP explicitly provides 
indigenous peoples with the power to determine the manner in which consultation processes 
take place in turn certifying that such processes ought to mirror indigenous decision-making 
practices.  According to Petkar, the “consulting and cooperating in good faith” as included in 
the Article clarifies the manner in which FPIC can be effectively operationalized echoing earlier 
wording contained within the Preamble which mentions a “spirit of partnership and mutual 
respect.”46  Importantly, Petkar writes that, “These negotiations in good faith guarantee the 
macro-objective of “participation in decision-making”, which in turn ensures that consent is 
obtained.”47  Taken together, the participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making that 
directly impacts them is arguably the underlying objective of the operationalization of FPIC 
within the Preamble of the UNDRIP as well as in various Articles mentioned subsequently 
throughout the Declaration.  
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 Article 28 declares that, “Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that 
include restitution or, which this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, 
prior and informed consent.  Section 2 of Article 29 pronounces that, “States shall take effective 
measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the 
lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.”  In 
relation to mining, this Article is tragically relevant in view of the reality that tailing ponds and 
the toxic chemical discharge which they so often fail to contain are a lamentable corollary to 
mining operations.  Critically, this specific article underscores that mining operations violate the 
right of indigenous peoples to FPIC in a myriad of ways and are not limited to just the physical 
establishment of the operation at the outset but rather can continue to lead to the 
infringement of Indigenous peoples’ rights long after the mine has ceased to operate for 
example through water contamination, irrevocable environmental degradation, loss of 
livelihoods etc.  Relatedly the Article highlights the fundamental importance of receiving 
consent of indigenous peoples from the preliminary stages of project development so as to 
prevent the escalation of human rights violations as outlined in the UNDRIP.   
Section 2 of Article 32 asserts that, “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith 
with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order 
to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their 
lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”  This specific article expounds 
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that national governments, as the primary human rights duty-bearer are first and foremost 
required to meaningful engage with indigenous communities who stand to be affected by a 
project or policy intervention.  The onus to receive the free, prior and informed consent is 
therefore a required responsibility of the State under the international human rights framework 
as it pertains to indigenous peoples.   
 The Convention on Biological Diversity’s Akwé Kon Voluntary guidelines also recognize 
the importance of involving indigenous peoples and local communities in the development and 
implementation of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments.  The Akwe Kon 
guidelines seek to operationalize FPIC by insisting on the full and effective participation and 
involvement of Indigenous and local communities in screening, scoping and development 
planning exercises, beginning at the very inception of the development or private-sector 
project. Article 53 of the Akwé Kon Voluntary guidelines explicitly requires that,  
Where the national legal regime requires prior informed consent of indigenous 
and local communities, the assessment process should consider whether such 
prior informed consent has been obtained.  Prior informed consent corresponding 
to various phases of the impact assessment process should consider the rights, 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities; the 
use of appropriate language and process; the allocation of sufficient time and the 
provision of accurate, factual and legally correct information.  Modifications to the 
initial development project proposal will require the additional prior informed 
consent of the affected indigenous and local communities.48 
 
 By advocating a collaborative strategy whereby governmental, indigenous and local community 
stakeholders work together, the Guidelines when followed take a proactive approach towards 
respecting the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities through reducing many of 
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the power and informational asymmetries that are inherent to many mining negotiations.  
Whereas the previous section has focused on voluntary, non-binding expressions of FPIC within 
international human rights frameworks, the following section examines international law and 
policy documents where FPIC is, in theory, considered binding to State parties.    
 The International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, (No. 
169) adopted in 1989 remains the most influential, legally binding, instrument pertaining to the 
protection and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights, particularly in Latin America.49  The 
right of Indigenous peoples to consultation, participation and the ability to grant consent 
surrounding any development process that may affect them is codified in Articles 6, 7, and 15 
of the Convention.  Article 6 (1) requires that governments “consult the peoples concerned, 
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, 
whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may 
affect them directly.  Article 7(1) takes into account the requirement that indigenous peoples 
should have the power to assess whether any proposed development aligns with their 
collective aspirations as peoples when it states that indigenous peoples “shall participate in the 
formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional 
development which may affect them directly.” Although the Convention only requires the 
consent of indigenous peoples when they are faced with relocation, the provisions set forth in 
the Convention clearly outline the positive obligations of States in regard to safeguarding the 
rights of Indigenous peoples.   
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 In her article, The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ 
Participation Rights within International Law, Tara Ward discusses the aforementioned legal 
instruments and asserts that the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC does not yet exist as a 
customary international legal principle, however she writes that, “There does appear to be a 
minimal norm developing that requires consultation in good faith.”50  She later points out that, 
“This developing norm requires that consultations take place prior to both the exploration and 
exploitation of resources within the territories of indigenous peoples or that affect traditionally 
used resources.”51  Rombouts shares a similar view, arguing that FPIC “is emerging as the key 
standard for including indigenous peoples in decision-making processes of their concern,” 
however the author points out that there is a lack of guidance in terms of the way in which FPIC 
can be implemented in various contexts.52  As the following section will showcase, FPIC when 
viewed as a voluntary requirement or as part of voluntary initiatives is rarely followed.   What 
this proves is that FPIC processes must coincide or at the very least be incorporated within 
mandatory procedures under international law, such as impact assessments, given the fact that 
environmental impact assessments are already a non-negotiable precondition for mining 
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Chapter Two: Human Rights Impact Assessments (HRAIs) and FPIC 
 
 
Carrying out Human Rights Impacts Assessments (HRIAs) has become an important way 
for corporations to operationalize human rights due diligence policies in an effort to prevent 
adverse human rights impacts stemming from their operations.  What differentiates HRIAs from 
other impact assessment mechanisms is the fact that they are based on a universally 
recognized, binding legal framework.  As a recent joint-report on HRIAs published by the World 
Bank and the Nordic Trust Fund points out, “The legal nature of the human rights framework 
can give greater force to recommendations arising from a HRIA, as it imposes clear legal 
obligations on states and other duty-bearers.  Consequently, a failure to comply with those 
duties represents a violation of a state’s legal obligation and gives rise to enforceable claims by 
rights-holders.”53  In this respect, by utilizing the international human rights framework, HRIAs 
help to identify and address human rights impacts and thus hold business accountable for any 
adverse human rights impacts to rights-holders by way of local stakeholder engagement, data 
collection and analysis as well prevention, mitigation and remediation efforts.54 
Grounded in the international human rights framework, a HRIA refers to the process by 
which human rights risks to rights-holders are assessed for the preventative, advocacy and 
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remedial potential.  HRIAs thus aim to strengthen positive outcomes associated with a business 
or development project by minimizing human rights risks and adverse impacts on community 
stakeholders. To further ensure that the agency and autonomy of rights-holders are both 
recognized and respected, human rights practitioners have begun advocating that such 
assessments are based on procedural components that emphasize participation and non-
discrimination.  As such, HRIAs have evolved from a largely company-led initiative to 
encompass alternative approaches to assessing potential adverse human rights risks that are 
more reflective of the very human rights framework which they are based on.  Today, 
community-based and collaborative (or hybrid) HRIAs have emerged as an important human 
rights due diligence tool aimed at reorienting and redefining risk, whereby potential adverse 
human rights impacts to communities is prioritized ahead of the risks such impacts might pose 
to shareholder value or to a company’s reputation.  By definition, community-based HRIAs 
emphasize that community perspectives offer the best vantage point from which to examine 




On the other hand, a collaborative or hybrid approach to a HRIA is a multi-stakeholder 
approach whereby project-affected people and a company work in concert with one another 
from the beginning of the assessment process to jointly investigate, measure and respond to 
the human rights impacts of the project.55  Unlike traditional company-led HRIAs which typically 
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hire external human rights consultants to assess a project’s human rights risks and in doing so 
often fails to adequately involve community stakeholders, collaborative HRIAs seek to create a 
company-community partnership by increasing the participation of affected people in decision-
making processes regarding the protection and promotion of their human rights.56  By creating 
a system in which key stakeholders can communicate and collaborate with one another, hybrid 
HRIAs have a number of important advantages.   
Firstly, through their emphasis on mutual co-operation, collaborative HRIAs can 
minimize informational asymmetries through providing a platform for dialogue wherein critical 
information can be shared. This is supported by research conducted by the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable Development, the Danish Institute for Human Rights and SciencePo Law School, 
who in their report on collaborative HRIAs, state that such mechanisms can “contribute to a 
deeper understanding of each stakeholder’s perspectives and priorities, help to build trust, and 
result in more effective action plans to address a project’s human rights impacts.”57   
By the same token, collaborative HRIAs provide a platform for project-affected people 
to directly negotiate and communicate with company representatives which produces several 
mutually beneficial outcomes in terms of the protection and promotion of human rights.  
Collaborative HRIAs, through establishing an avenue for reciprocal dialogue enables companies 
participating in such a process to better comprehend the differential operational impacts of 
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their projects on local communities and their obligations as duty-bearers.58  By actively and 
meaningfully engaging with local community stakeholders by way of a collaborative HRIA, 
companies are more likely to earn the trust of communities and in turn receive a social license 
to operate (SLO).59  Earning an SLO through consultation with local communities and 
conducting comprehensive human rights due diligence processes will decrease the likelihood 
that social-conflicts stemming from the implementation of a particular project will erupt, 
arguably  increasing the likelihood that human rights can be protected and promoted. 
In an effort to mainstream HRIAs into corporate practice, numerous NGOs have made a 
business case for operationalizing HRIAs arguing that they can become an effective risk 
mitigation and management tool.60 The business case for collaborative HRIAs is based on the 
belief that when companies assess risks to right-holders in a decision-making process that 
includes meaningful engagement with community stakeholders, the risk of project-related 
social conflicts is reduced as well as the attendant financial and reputational costs that such 
conflicts engender.  A study by Davis and Franks which examined 50 cases of company-
community conflict within the extractive sector revealed that the majority of extractive 
companies “do not currently identify, understand and aggregate” the significant and full range 
of costs associated with the manifestation of company-community conflict, which they 
characterize as both real and significant.61  That being said, HRIAs, particularly those of the 
collaborative kind, offer mining companies a way to inform communities adjacent to their 
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proposed operations of the impact of their activities through knowledge sharing.  In order to 
avoid costly company-community conflict, mining companies should dedicate more of their 
resources to human rights due diligence, specifically developing mechanisms to increase 
communication, information and collaboration with local communities located in the regions in 





In contrast to collaborative approaches to HRIAs, community-based HRIAs take local 
stakeholder engagement further with local communities directly overseeing the process of 
identifying human rights risks and ensuring that such processes are rooted and begin from a 
community rather than from a company perspective.62  For local community stakeholders, 
community-based HRIAs effectuate the very human rights risks they seek to assess.  They 
achieve this by focusing on the capacity building and empowerment of local communities 
through education and training on human rights.63  When compared with collaborative 
approaches to HRIAs, community-based HRIAs take local stakeholder engagement and 
community participation as the foundation on which to ground the assessment.  The intense 
community involvement which characterizes community-based HRIAs offers many benefits in 
terms of operationalizing human rights, arguably leading to more productive outcomes.64   
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By allowing communities to take a leading role in identifying impacts on human rights, 
community-based HRIAs place potentially affected stakeholders in a position of power in 
negotiations and decision-making processes with companies, investors and governments.65  
This is a marked departure from traditional approaches to local community engagement with 
respect to project approval.  As a report published by the World Resources Institute points out, 
“Official approval processes often marginalize – or bypass entirely – host communities and 
other locally affected interests.”66  Such processes are as paternalistic as they are paradoxical.  
The very stakeholders – the host communities -- who are most likely to be impacted the most 
by the implementation of the project, the operations of which, in terms of the mining sector, 
will have irrevocable impact on their surrounding environment, are relegated to what the 
World Resources Institute describes as “observer status.”  As such, community-based HRIAs 
have the view that host communities should play a principal role in decision-making processes 
especially those that have the potential to impact their fundamental human rights. 
Community-based HRIAs operationalize human rights in a myriad of ways.  Considering 
that community participation and respect for local agency is the starting point from which the 
assessment process occurs, community-based HRIAs are more likely to attain greater 
community participation in comparison to company-led HRIAs which are typically met with 
apprehension and distrust.67 Robust community participation in the HRIA resulting from the 
empowerment, capacity building and intense engagement of local communities ensures more 
comprehensive assessment outcomes.  This can be attributed to the fact that local stakeholders 
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are best placed to identify serious human rights risks that companies or external-consultants 
are more likely to overlook.68  Further, because of community based HRIA’s focus on capacity-
building and community empowerment they avoid a critical shortcoming that company-led 
HRIAs suffer from: the failure to obtain and retain the trust of local community members.69    
 HRIAs have emerged as relatively new human rights due diligence tools and therefore 
their utility in terms of enforcing a corporate duty of care in regard to human rights remains 
controversial.  As the previous section has argued, many human rights organizations and 
academics have heralded HRIAs as an important mechanism to assess whether a company is 
respecting or failing to respect international human rights standards.  However, similar to other 
human rights tools there exists the potential for HRIAs to be misused.  Examining the efficacy of 
HRIAs is difficult to entertain in so far as very few of the completed assessments are publically 
available.  However, in 2010 Goldcorp’s was forced to carry out a human rights assessment at 
its Marlin Mine in Guatemala, the findings of which were eventually made public by the 
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Chapter Three:  Assessing the Utility of HIRAs in Safeguarding the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
 




Situated in Northwestern Guatemala, in the country’s mountainous “Altiplano” 
highlands, the Marlin Mine is an open pit and underground gold and silver mine that 
encompasses an estimated area of five square kilometers.70   Positioned between the two 
municipalities of San Miguel Ixtahuacán (SMI) and Sipakapa, the region is home to two 
indigenous Mayan groups: with the first home to mostly Mayan-Mams and the latter of Mayan 
– Sipakapense.  According to a 2003 census, SMI has a total population of around 37,000 spread 
across seventeen villages and forty-three communities.71  On the other hand, Sipakapa consists 
of twelve villages and nineteen communities amounting to roughly 14,000 inhabitants.72  
In the face of overwhelming pressure from company shareholders worried about the 
adverse human rights impacts that Goldcorp was having in Guatemala, the company agreed to 
carry out an HRIA at the Marlin Mine and commissioned Common Ground Consultants to 
conduct the assessment.  Many of the challenges that Common Ground faced while identifying 
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the impacts of the Marlin Mine on human rights, illustrate important lessons that should be 
incorporated into future HRIAs.  Most importantly, the findings of the assessment revealed the 
value of ex-ante assessments versus post-ante risk management procedures and the 
importance of implementing HRIAs that are collaborative or community-based.  Goldcorp’s 
decision to conduct the HRIA occurred after the mine had already been in operation for several 
years thereby enabling dissension to be fomented within the community regarding the overall 
sufficiency of the consultation process.73  According to the assessors, the escalation of conflict 
around the mine had reached the point at which a comprehensive participatory process would 
have jeopardized the safety of participants making a HRIA no longer feasible.74  As such, the 
decision was made to reformulate the work as a Human Rights Assessment in place of a Human 
Rights Impact Assessment.75   
Aside from underscoring the utility of ex-ante HRIAS when it comes to assessing a 
company’s impacts on human rights, Goldcorp’s HRIA reveals that in the right environment 
HRIAs can do more harm than good.  What is meant by this is that in contexts where a mining 
corporation has already breached the trust of community, any effort to mitigate previous 
abuses will likely be viewed with apprehension or through a highly critical lens. Catherine 
Coumans from MiningWatch Canada argues that the HRIA conducted at the Marlin Mine 
essentially provided Goldcorp with a diversion to deflect criticism away from the company by 
pointing to the ongoing HRIA process as indicative of its vigilance towards human rights, 
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meanwhile business operations remained unchanged.76  Furthermore, Coumans underlines that 
“the HRIA relieved increasingly effective community pressure on the company to cease land 
acquisitions and halt expansion plans” with Goldcorp ultimately ignoring these 
recommendations by local communities once the HRIA concluded with the end result being 
“increased conflict in communities already experiencing high levels of tension and violence.”77  
Although the implementation and publication of Goldcorp’s HRIA is commendable in its own 
right given the reluctance of most companies to initiate them let alone publish their findings, 
the HRIA reveals several important findings.   
To start with, Goldcorp’s HRIA reveals that mining activities should be suspended until a 
formal consultation process, one reflective of international human rights law, can be facilitated.  
Suspension of mining activities will signal to local communities that the company is serious 
when it comes to preventing any additional adverse human rights impacts and that the 
company is willing to halt mining activities until it is able to engage with local communities in a 
meaningful manner.  Further, suspending mining activities will also prevent HRIAs from being 
used as a mere window-dressing as egregious human rights and environmental impacts 
continue unabated.  As Coumans outlined, Goldcorp was able to continue with business as 
usual as the HRIA process was conducted over a period of two years despite widespread 
community suffering.78  In effect, the commissioning of the HRIA provided Goldcorp with a de 
facto license to continue to adversely impact human rights and the environment unabated.   
Common Ground’s HRIA also makes clear that in contexts where there are pre-existing 
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company-community conflicts, a community-based HRIA, with an external consultant firm like 
Common Ground acting as a neutral third-party arbiter, would have likely been advantageous 
given the situational factors surrounding the Marlin mine.  
The need for collaborative or community-based HRIAs, with respect to mining projects 
in Guatemala, is further buttressed by the ineffectiveness and exclusionary nature of 
government mandated Environment and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs).  During the course 
of 79 interviews of various stakeholders involved in ESIAs, including project-affected people, 
municipal officials and public servants from Guatemala’s Ministries of Energy and Mining 
(MEM) and of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARN), Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch found 
that ESIAs preclude meaningful community participation in decision-making processes due to 
the Government of Guatemala’s lack of capacity of and mishandling of ESIAs.79  Additionally, 
the interviews revealed that the EIA processes in Guatemala suffer from a lack of government 
oversight making them susceptible to abuse.  Moreover, because mining companies often hire 
consultants to conduct ESIAs accountability is further decreased.  For example, Interviewees in 
the study recounted instances of fraudulent FPIC processes by which consultants asked 
community stakeholders to offer their signatures following an information session without 
informing them as to what their signatures represented.80  The consultants were then able to 
use the signatures as evidence that they had followed proper government protocol and 
involved project-affected people in the EIA process and thus had proof of community consent 
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for the project.81  Other interviewees disclosed similar examples of corruption such as 
consultants offering community leaders jobs, projects or bribes in exchange for persuading 
various community-stakeholders to grant consent for a given project.82   
The ease at which ESIAs are used as a means to further the objectives of -- external 
consultants, mining companies and the government of Guatemala --every actor except the one 
they are intended for underscores that appropriate government authorities and company 
representatives are too far removed from the process.  The ability of mining companies to 
transfer their ESIA responsibilities to consultants in effect translates into an abdication of 
responsibility. As Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch note, this creates conflict and mistrust which is 
further exacerbated given that the Government of Guatemala lacks the necessary capacity to 
effectively monitor and evaluate the work of consultants.83  Furthermore, in Guatemala the 
various procedural requirements of ESIAs have had the effect of excluding its intended 
beneficiaries.  For instance, community-capacity building is not a required precondition of ESIAs 
and thus community members do not receive the necessary training and education in order to 
understand the highly technical and scientific vernacular that ESIAs often use.84  Aguilar-Støen 
and Hirsch’s research also highlighted that project companies in Guatemala do not inform 
affected communities about ESIAs rather it is the responsibility of communities to search for 
information regarding the ESIAs on their own.85  Similarly, information gathered from 
interviews also indicated that the Government of Guatemala also does not have any 
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procedures in place that allows for EIA reports to be distributed among affected parties.86  The 
inaccessibility of information pertaining to EIAs is further increased given that EIA reports are 
only publicized at the MARN offices in Guatemala City forcing project-affected people to travel 
long distances in order to gain access to the reports.87  When, and if, communities discover 
such information, it is often not translated in local indigenous language despite government 
regulations stipulating that such translations be a required component of ESIAs.88 More than 
anything, calculated attempts to deprive local communities’ of access to important information 
regarding how a proposed project will affect their lands, natural resources and ultimately their 
lives and livelihoods speaks to, and is indicative of, the various processes at play to circumvent 
the need for meaningful participation of local communities, particularly those of Indigenous 
peoples.  
 The blatant disregard for the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC processes by various 
EIA stakeholders showcases that current best practices are inadequate in ensuring Indigenous 
involvement prior to, and following the assessment. The significant barriers surrounding the 
use of foreign language that is highly technical, coupled with geographical distance makes EIAs 
an unsuitable mechanism to safeguard the right of indigenous people to FPIC and self-
determination.  Several organizations such as Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI) and The Danish Human Rights Institute have stated that companies may be more willing 
to undertake a collaborative HRIA if they can incorporate it into ESIAs given that they are 
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already planned or required.89  As the Guatemalan context illustrates, such recommendations 
should be critically scrutinized and reviewed on a case by case basis.  In countries where 
substantial governance gaps exist and where EIAs are often just a box-ticking exercise, 
collaborative HRIAs provide an opportunity for both companies and project-affected people to 
face many of the structural shortcomings innate to traditional assessment processes.90  In 
contrast to traditional EIAs and company commissioned HRIAs, collaborative HRIAs offer 
considerable benefits as a result of their emphasis on the inclusion of project-affected people in 
important decision-making processes.  Bearing in mind that community stakeholders are 
generally best-placed to understand local contexts in terms of human rights, collaborative or 
community-based HRIAs offer an opportunity for more detailed and nuanced impact 
assessments.  




The pervasive violation of human rights in all of the communities where I conducted 
interviews indicates that existing assessment procedures analyzing social or environmental 
impacts are grossly inadequate in terms of their ability to secure respect for the human rights 
of rights-holders or correspondingly hold duty-bearers to account when adverse impacts arise.  
Although a comprehensive comparison of the strengths and shortcomings of each impact 
assessment methodology is well-beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to acknowledge 
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and underscore that the central objective of HRIAs is to empower rights-holders, hold duty-
bearers to account and in doing so help to identify and address human rights impacts in such a 
way that leads to the reconfiguration of power-relations.91  
In countries such as Guatemala, the focus of HRIAs on power redistribution is especially 
important considering that the manifestation of mining companies within the country occurs 
through the exploitation and subjugation of historically marginalized indigenous communities 
whose agency and autonomy continues to be kept in check by the National Government.  The 
perception that such communities are powerless to stop mining companies and other private 
actors from the illegal encroachment and misappropriation of their lands, territories and 
resources is confirmed by the very presence of mining operations on their ancestral lands.  The 
presence of such companies despite their failure to receive the FPIC of communities as well as 
the impunity with which military and private security personnel are able to execute anyone 
who attempts to speak truth to power underscores the fact that such companies (often 
working in concert with the government) view Indigenous communities as immaterial and non-
autonomous actors who must be controlled by the State.   
Interviews with mining-impacted communities across Guatemala revealed the blatancy 
and ease with which human rights violations were committed by mining companies without 
fear of consequence.  Repeatedly, interviewees cited the lack of consultation as the precursor 
to serious human rights abuses.  For instance, Miguel Angel, a Mayan leader from San Miguel 
Ixtahuacán, a community affected by the Marlin Mine, voiced his indignation with the mining 
company’s perception that they could circumvent their obligation to engage in good-faith 
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consultations with members of his community by communicating and receiving authorization to 
conduct mining operations from the Guatemalan Government instead; “This mining company 
(referring to Goldcorp) established themselves without consultation but through the 
government.”92 Angel went on to describe Goldcorp as monster, stating that, “This monster is a 
big invader. An invader of our communities and of our lives and livelihoods.  That’s why we said 
no to mining because they are putting our lives in danger.”  In addition to accusations that 
Goldcorp’s ignored their obligation to consult the communities of Sipakapa and San Miguel 
Ixtahuacán, Angel also spoke of the terrorization tactics that were used by armed men believed 
to be linked to Goldcorp who used violence to intimidate and silence community members who 
resisted and opposed the mining project through peaceful protests.   
Last year in 2017, we had a blockade, we wanted to ask the government if they 
were hearing us and what we were demanding.  On April 5th, they tricked us 
because at that time they changed the government.  So finally, we got a date 
where we could meet with the general manager of the company.  They said the 
meeting would be at a military base.  We are not delinquents or criminals so 
they cannot take us to a military base and intimidate us in that way.  Instead of 
a military base we went to the police base.93  
 
During my interviews, Angel also spoke of a failed assassination attempt on his life, 
specifying April 14th, 2010 as the day that, “they (armed gunman allegedly linked to Goldcorp) 
tried to kill me.”94  Information collected from Angel also underscored community-led efforts to 
initiate their own FPIC processes.  Despite attempts by local authorities to prevent the 
community from holding a consulta, Angel spoke defiantly when explaining how “there were 
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some (consultas) that were done almost clandestinely.”95  The presence of consultas despite 
the Guatemalan government unleashing grave threats in order to enforce their prohibition 
illustrates the degree to which the community of San Miguel Ixtahuacán was willing to go to 
resist the expropriation of their lands, territories and natural resources.  Similarly, the 
conversation with Angel also made clear that neither the Guatemalan Government nor 
Goldcorp made any effort to inform the local community surrounding the potential impacts 
resulting from the mining operation.  Responding to this negligence, Angel again spoke of his 
community’s independent aspirations to educate themselves regarding the various ways in 
which the mine may impact their local environment.  “We are starting a study of water 
contamination and we want to do more science studies in the future.”96  Such studies, 
according to Angel are being done to accompany scientific research conducted by Guatemala’s 
Ministry of Health which determined that 45 members of San Miguel Ixtahuacán had serious 
health effects including skin infections and disease.97 
Efforts by the community of San Miguel Ixtahuacán to facilitate their own local 
plebiscites, in addition to scientific impact assessments showcases the inadequacy of similar 
efforts orchestrated by Goldcorp and the Guatemalan Government.  Suggestively, the 
formation of consultas and the initiation of additional impact assessment research by 
community-members points to a prevailing practice that permits powerful corporate and 
government actors to bypass people who stand to be most affected by the mining project.  
Relatedly, the experience of San Miguel Ixtahuacán indicates that FPIC processes, specifically 
                                                      




those pertaining to the preliminary impact assessment phases, ought to be defined by 
unreserved community-ownership and participation.   Such processes should also be preferable 
to corporate or government led procedures which engage with local community-members on 
paper but not in practice.  
Aniseto López, the Director of FREDEMI (San Miguel Ixtahuacán Defense Front or Frente 
de Defensa Miguelense in Spanish) also outlined how the operation of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine 
adversely impacted the sociopolitical situation of the community of San Miguel Ixtahuacán.  
Lopez alleges that the mine created very serious divisions within the community through the 
co-optation of local government authorities.  According to Lopez, such divisions and struggle for 
power “played itself out at the municipal level where wealthy political parties who wanted the 
mine profited.”98  Furthermore, these divisions were exacerbated when members of the local 
political elite allegedly attempted to intimidate local community members into submission by 
commissioning armed assailants to assault those resistant to the mine.99  Lopez believes that 
municipal political authorities “hired local people and thugs as hitman to orchestrate 
attacks.”100  He went on to explain how on February 28th 2011, “pistolarios used very serious 
violence to break up the roadblock” that the community had established to peacefully protest 
Goldcorp’s mining operations.101   
The following section will provide a detailed description of a testimonio given by 
Diadora Hernández, a woman living in San Miguel Ixtahuacán next to the Marlin Mine, who is 
                                                      





believed to have been shot in the head for her refusal to sell her three hectares of land to 
Goldcorp.   
This is a story of suffering.  Before the mining company came here, we were happy.  
Look at my eye.  They (Goldcorp) didn’t ask for my permission to build a road 
across my land.  All my suffering has to do with me not wanting to sell my land.  I 
was complaining to the compoyetes and they threatened me with a machete.  I 
had my grand-daughter in my hands.  After threatening me they tried to kill her.  
Former mining security tricked me and my daughter when they invited us out for 
coffee and one of them pulled out his gun and shot me in the head.  All these 
people came here to screw with me to pressure me to sell my land: the mayor, the 
company.  I own and live on this land, I am not a renter.  Where would I go if I were 
to sell this land.  Most people who sold (their land) did so because they were 
obliged to by the Mayor’s office.  Most of the people who sold their land are only 
left with a small parcel of land. With respect to the Canadian Government, all it did 
was result in suffering.  The strength to remain comes from the conviction that it 
doesn’t make sense to leave my land and animals. I have neighbours/friends who 
love me.  Every time I think about the mine or answers to these questions I start to 
cry.102   
 
Aside from highlighting the sheer depravity Goldcorp was willing to unleash on those who 
opposed their mining operations, Diadora’s testimonio also substantiates widely-held 
allegations that Goldcorp failed to receive the FPIC of the communities of Sipakapa and San 
Miguel Ixachtuacán.  Furthermore, Diadora’s testimonio indicates that even if Goldcorp didn’t 
directly instruct armed men to use violence to intimate opposing the mine, they clearly did not 
fulfill their duty of care as a signatory to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
by ensuring that violence wasn’t used to coerce community members to accept the mine. 
 The interviews conducted in San Miguel Ixtahuacán underscore that many community 
members adjacent to Goldcorp’s operations feel neglected, disregarded and violated.  With 
hindsight, it is clear that the company’s assessment of the potential adverse impacts of its 
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operations was at best inadequate, by failing to engage and encourage the participation of a 
wide array of community stakeholders and at worst, non-existent.  The failure to include 
community stakeholders from the outset and operationalizing the right of indigenous people 
living within the community to FPIC has been a costly mistake for Goldcorp; financially, 
reputationally, environmentally and most importantly in terms of its cost to human life.  That 
being said, the experience of the Marlin Mine makes clear that assessment and consultation 
processes, especially those being facilitated in post-conflict contexts such as Guatemala, 
require a participatory and human rights based approach, one where community stakeholders 
can voice their concerns and/or perspectives in a meaningful way.  Anything less than this with 
respect to a mining operation, will in all likelihood, create a climate of rampant suspicions, fear, 
miscommunications and community-divisions.  For that reason, community-based and to a 
lesser degree, collaborative HRIAs, through their emphasis on transparency, participation and 
the empowerment of rights-holders reflect a human-rights based paradigm and therefore offer 
a viable, and preferable alternative to traditional, company-led assessment and human rights 
due diligence processes.   
 
 
CONFRONTING THE COMPLICITY OF CANADIAN MINING COMPANIES IN THE 
CONTRAVENTION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS WORLDWIDE 
 
 
In Canada, the absence of a strong regulatory framework able to ensure that the foreign 
activities of mining companies domiciled in the country act in accordance with international 
human rights obligations is palpably absent.  Rather than develop proactive approaches to 
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preventing adverse environmental impacts and egregious violations of human rights, the 
Government of Canada has instead focused their efforts on reactionary responses that seek to 
safeguard the status quo by providing Canadian mining companies with virtually free rein to 
plunder and pillage at will.   Canadian mining companies have taken advantage of Canada’s 
weak regulatory landscape amassing huge profits at the expense of the rights of Indigenous 
peoples and environmental sustainability.  That being said, in a country where saying “sorry” is 
synonymous with national identity, Canadian mining companies have stayed true to form, 
adopting apologist tactics when pressed to explain their role in contributing to gross violations 
of human rights and environmental degradation in the regions in which the operate.  
 A leaked report from the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, an 
organization which represents 8,000 members of the international mining community, 
discovered that Canadian mining companies are disproportionally involved in incidents of 
human rights violations, environmental degradation and company-community confrontations 
at a rate four times higher than any other country.103  In many ways this is foreseeable in view 
of the fact that Canada is home to 75% of the world’s mining companies.104  Such a high 
concentration of mining companies in the country can be attributed to Canada’s permissive 
mining regulatory framework coupled with political, economic and legal privileges granted to 
such companies by the Government of Canada.   
Canada’s role as a global financial hub for the mining industry is illustrated best by the 
fact that in the 2016 fiscal year 57% of the global mining financing was traded on the Toronto 
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Stock Exchange (TSC) with a total value of $189 billion.105  Interestingly, there were 6,307 
mining projects listed on the TSX in 2016, 47% of which were located outside of Canada.106  The 
increasing domiciliation of mining companies in Canada implies that there are significant 
incentives for registering a mining company in the country.  Considering that Canada’s mining 
industry contributed $8.5 billion in tax income to the Canadian government in 2012 (most 
recent data available), and was responsible for 18% of Canada’s GDP in 2015,107 the sector plays 
a crucial role in the nation’s economy.  In light of this, the Canadian government has enacted 
policies to sustain the supremacy of Canada’s mining sector, both domestically and 
internationally.  Government agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAITD), the Investment Board of the Canadian Pension Plan and Export 
Development Canada (EDC) taken together provide government grants, insurance, loans and 
investment guarantees to Canadian mining companies.108  However, the significant financial 
and political support provided to such companies has neither been supplemented by strong 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) screening mechanisms, such as HRIAs nor 
sufficient guarantees from the companies themselves that their operations will not contribute 
to negative environmental and human impacts in the regions in which they operate. 
In order to better promote and protect human rights within Canada’s extractive sector, 
moving forward the Government of Canada must ensure that the agencies responsible for 
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providing mining companies with fiscal supports are made more transparent.  For instance, the 
EDC which provides mining companies insurance against political risks is not required to 
disclose its due diligence processes for proposed projects and does not stipulate that the FPIC 
of communities be a necessary prerequisite for project approval.  As mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, considering that approximately half of the world’s remaining natural 
mineral resources are estimated to lie beneath lands and territories inhabited by Indigenous 
Peoples109, making consultations with Indigenous communities through HRIAs a prerequisite to 
accessing finance and receiving project approval would help to ensure that such projects are in 
accordance with international human rights obligations, specifically the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights’ of Indigenous People and the ILO’s Convention 169. The 
effectiveness of this enforcement measure is relative to the amount of financial support these 
companies receive from the Canadian Government.  As Schnoor points out, “many companies 
may operate with relatively minimal public support, or may not be significantly affected by the 
withdrawal of support that they do receive.”110  Therefore, this shortcoming highlights that 
threatening to withdraw government support for foreign investment projects, by itself is not 
enough.  Thus, to combat this flaw, such policies ought to be accompanied with the possibility 
of punitive measures to pressure companies to act in accordance with their human rights 
obligations and uphold the UNGPS to which they are, in theory, answerable to.   
A recent report entitled, The impact of Canadian Mining in Latin America and Canada’s 
Responsibility which investigated the impact of 22 mining projects of Canadian mining 
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companies in nine countries in South America found that the Government of Canada’s support 
for some extractive projects was unperturbed by allegations of environmental abuses and 
human rights violations with some Canadian embassies even serving as negotiators between 
the company, the host state and Canada despite the knowledge of such harms.111  Even more 
damning the report revealed that, “the Canadian government has advised several governments 
of countries where Canadian companies operate on the need for them to change their 
regulatory frameworks regarding environmental studies, citizen participation, oversight, and 
land availability for mining concessions.”112  Such actions signal that, for the Canadian 
government, profit motives take precedence over human and environmental considerations 
and that the complicity of the Canadian government in human rights violations committed by 
its mining industries takes many forms.   
The Government of Canada could also advance human rights and help promote more 
inclusive, sustainable development within its mining sector by making the financial transactions 
between host-country governments and Canadian mining companies more transparent by 
implementing the EITI in Canada.  The benefits of doing so are twofold.  First, the 
implementation of the EITI in Canada would contribute to better natural resource governance 
both domestically and internationally, ensuring that Canadian companies are not concealing 
taxable income, that corruption is minimized and developing economies are not deprived of the 
resource rents derived from their countries natural resource wealth.  Canada’s involvement 
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with the EITI has been stagnant since it first gained supporter status in 2007.113  With 3 out of 4 
of the world’s mining companies headquartered in country, Canada’s membership within the 
EITI would deal a significant blow to corruption, tax evasion and non-transparency which is 
pervasive in the global extractive sector in general and especially prevalent in Canada’s mining 
industry in particular.   Secondly, the implementation of the initiative would complement 
Canada’s recent Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act (ESTMA) which is designed to 
deter corruption through establishing mandatory reporting requirements for extractive entities 
who make payments of $100,000 more to “any level of government in Canada or abroad.”114  
Unlike similar extractive sector transparency laws enacted in the United States and the 
European Union, Canada’s ESTMA does not specify that extractive companies domiciled in the 
country must report on a project by project basis.  In effect, this restricts the ability of the 
ESTMA to promote local accountability and in turn limits its overall utility in terms of being able 
to hold extractive companies and governments accountable.115 As such, the act should be 
reexamined so as to mirror other extractive sector transparency regulations such as section 
1504 of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, which stipulates project-level reporting,116 and should also 
consider the degree to which such information will be made accessible to the public.  
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At present, Canada’s permissive regulatory framework and a combination of political 
and economic privileges provided to mining companies has resulted in Canada becoming a 
haven for the world’s mining industries.  Going forward, the Government of Canada must take 
proactive steps to oblige mining companies domiciled within Canada to exercise greater 
environmental and human rights due diligence within its operations, both at home and abroad.  
So far, the Government of Canada’s response has largely been the inverse, choosing instead to 
devise strategies to establish or strengthen mechanisms that deal with the repercussions of 
human rights violations rather than focusing on preventative efforts.  Even then, the Canadian 
Government’s response has been appallingly inadequate in so far as victims of Canadian mining 
companies have few avenues for legal recourse or remedy as will be illustrated in the following 
section.   
As an adhering government to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the 
Government of Canada is required to set up a National Contact Point (NCP) as a way to 
promote and implement the Guidelines.117  NCPs are a voluntary, non-judicial grievance 
mechanism whose purpose is to facilitate constructive dialogue and mediation between 
aggrieved parties and an enterprise once a formal complaint has been submitted and reviewed. 
The Canadian NCP’s objectives might be noble in theory, however in practice the Government 
of Canada has failed to mirror the implementation procedures regarding the establishment of a 
NCP set forth in the OECD Guidelines.  As a consequence of this, Canada’s NCP is characterized 
by severe structural weaknesses to the effect that the mechanism is rendered virtually 
powerless, further constraining the ability of victims to receive judicial redress.  
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A case in point is the complaint submitted by a local Guatemalan NGO working in 
concert with international NGOs to have allegations of human rights violations resulting from 
the Marlin Mine reviewed by the Canadian National Contact Point.  Guatemalan NGO, FREDEMI 
supported by the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) (the “Notifiers”), a land-
rights advocacy NGO based in Washington D.C., filed a request for review with Canada’s NCP on 
December 9, 2009.118  Contained within FREDEMI’s submission are allegations that Goldcorp 
operations at the Marlin Mine “are not consistent with Guatemala’s obligations to respect the 
rights to life, health, water, property, to be free from racial discrimination, and to free, prior 
and informed consent.”119  Further, FREDEMI demanded that in order for the NCP to effectively 
address human rights concerns held by the community, the Marlin Mine must be closed.120  As 
stated in the NCP complaint, FREDEMI was of the view that a facilitated dialogue with Goldcorp 
would only result in delays.  In order to move forward, FREDEMI urged the NCP to undertake a 
full investigation into Goldcorp’s activities and the various adverse impacts associated with the 
mine’s operations.121   
The NCP’s response to the issues raised by FREDMI and CIEL attributed the gross 
injustices of the Marlin Mine to a lack of communication or “possible miscommunication.”122  In 
its consideration of the specific instance, the NCP went as far as recommending that because of 
the significant operations surrounding mining, mining companies, “should endeavor to use 
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effective communication strategies in order to engage the communities affected by the mine 
and to disseminate information of a technical or scientific nature.”  The report goes on to add 
that such efforts are a vital component of corporate social responsibility which the NCP states 
believes “if managed successfully may benefit all parties concerned.”  In the NCP’s final 
recommendations, it outlined that “communication and dialogue between the company and 
the notifies are essential to the resolution of any disputes … Therefore, the NCP recommends 
that the parties participate in constructive dialogue in good faith with a view to addressing the 
issues raised.  The sooner the parties agree to engage in a meaningful dialogue, the better it 
will be for all concerned.” The NCP’s recommendations consisted of a mere five sentences 
before stating that “the NCP considers this specific instance to be closed.”  
In recommending that Goldcorp and the Notifiers engage in dialogue, the NCP is in 
effect siding with the company.  FREDEMI’s request that mining operation cease as prerequisite 
to dialogue with the company was not an unreasonable demand to make in light of its daily 
detrimental effects to the surrounding communities and their local environment.  Had Goldcorp 
halted its operations, it would have signaled to FREDEMI and affected-community members 
that it took the recommendations set forth in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises seriously and that it was willing to make a concerted effort to rectify and eradicate 
any previous or current adverse impacts associated with the company’s operations.  
Furthermore, as far as the NCP recommending facilitated dialogue, the appropriate time for 
that would have been prior to the mine’s construction.  Goldcorp, by virtue of establishing the 
mine without the FPIC of the communities of Sipakapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacán has 
demonstrated that it does not respect neither the autonomy nor agency of these communities, 
 67 
nor has it provided any credible actions or evidence, other than willing to engage in dialogue 
after the mine was already constructed and in operation for several years. Had Goldcorp halted 
its operations until after dialogue with FREDEMI and CIEL was facilitated, the company would 
have signaled that it was willing to change course by, at the very least, being open to listening 
to the perspectives and grievances of local community stakeholders before reaching a 
conclusion as to how to move forward.  
As FREDEMI’s experience with Canada’s NCP makes clear, Canada’s efforts to implement 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and by extension promote some semblance 
of corporate accountability is seriously wanting. Such sentiments are well known within 
Canadian human rights based advocacy organizations. A recent report published by Above 
Ground, MiningWatch Canada and OECD Watch revealed that Canada’s NCP is somewhat 
inconsistent with other NCPs in that it does not contain an independent decision-making or 
oversight committee, is opaque, took approximately three to four times longer to present an 
initial assessment, inhibited by unjustified delays, maintains a high threshold for accepting 
complaints, does not publish its findings in terms of company breaches of the OECD guidelines, 
requires that complaints assume a portion of the associated costs.123 Finally the report notes 
that, “The process rarely concludes with an agreement or recommendations, and there are no 
effective follow-up procedures in place” and “the government penalty is ineffective in 
promoting compliance with the OECD Guidelines.”124  What is made clear is that the available 
channels to hold mining companies to account for gross abuses in Canada are either non-
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existent or grossly inadequate.   In light of this, and as the filing to Canada’s NCP on the Marlin 
Marlin makes clear, the Government of Canada ought to commit to reforming the Canadian 
National Contact Point so that affected stakeholders’ groups have access to judicial recourse 
and mining companies are held accountable for their acts or acts of omission.   
By the same token, in order to move beyond toothless, voluntary initiatives, the 
Government of Canada ought to consider reintroducing legislation similar to Bill C-438 or the 
Extraterritorial Activities of Canadian Business and Entities Act which failed to pass in front of 
Canada’s parliament.  Such legislation should include the establishment of a permanent, 
independent of the government mechanism, such as a human rights ombudsman for the 
extractive sector.  The Human Rights Ombudsman should have the power to receive and 
independently investigate complaints and in turn offer recommendations for remedial action to 
the Canadian government, extractive corporations.  Most importantly, as MiningWatch Canada 
recommends, “The ombudsman also should be able to recommend the suspension or cessation 
of political, financial and diplomatic support by the Government of Canada.125 At present, 
Canada’s strategy to enforce business practices which entail respect for human rights and 
sustainable development while abroad, lacks the investigative, mandatory requirements and 
judicial mechanisms necessary to give it effective power.  
When it comes to enforcing human rights obligations in business, the United Nation’s 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights recommend “a smart mix of measures – 
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national and international, mandatory and voluntary.”126  The government of Canada has not 
heeded this advice and has chosen instead to base its extractive sector regulatory framework 
on a series of voluntary requirements that effectively provides mining companies domiciled in 
Canada with a license to commit human and environmental violations with near perfect 
impunity.  When asked why so many of the world’s mining companies are headquartered in 
Canada and why so many of them are industry leaders for all the wrong reasons, the mining 
industry and the Government of Canada are rife with apologists – blaming the jurisdictional 
complexities of prosecuting crimes committed abroad and the number of human rights 
violations committed by Canadian mining companies as an unfortunate by-product of doing 
business in a sector prone to such risks.  Considering that extractive industries in general and 
mining in particular are known for having increased adverse human rights and environmental 
impacts, it only seems logical that the sector should then have heightened due diligence 
requirements proportional to their human rights risk potential.  In this respect, Canada’s 
current course of action is wanting and thus requires a paradigm shift from reactive responses 
to human rights violations committed by Canadian mining companies to one that prioritize the 
adoption of prescriptive policy reforms that concentrate on preventative procedures and is 
inclusive of an immediate plan of action.  One such policy reform that ought to be considered is 
introducing mandatory HRIAs in legislation and other jurisprudential processes aimed at 
improving Canada’s track record with regard to responsible resource development.  The 
significance of mandatory HRIAs in Canadian mining legislation will be discussed in the 
following section.  
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Chapter Four:  Prioritizing Proactive Policy Prescriptions 




In its concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, published in March 
of 2016, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights urged Canada 
to strengthen legislation in order to effectively monitor the extraterritorial activities of 
corporations registered or domiciled in Canada and their compliance with international human 
rights law.127  To further this goal, the Committee recommended that the Government of 
Canada establish a mechanism with investigative powers in order to examine complaints filed 
against corporations.  Moreover, the Committee outlined that historically, Canada has neither 
ensured that victims of corporate abuses have had access to judicial remedy nor worked to 
improve the effectiveness of existing non-judicial remedial mechanisms as was mentioned 
previously.  Further the Committee highlighted its concern surrounding the absence of human 
rights impact assessments (emphasis added) conducted “prior to the negotiation of 
international trade and investment agreements,” and that such “investment agreements 
negotiated by Canada recognize the primacy of its international human rights obligations over 
investors’ interests, so that the introduction of Investor-State dispute settlement procedures 
shall not create obstacles to the full realization of Covenant rights.” In this respect, the 
Committee rather than recommending HRIAs on a project-by-project basis goes a step further 
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when it advocates for a country-level HRIA prior to conducting and engaging in a trade and 
investment agreement with a potential partner.  Considering that most Canadian mining 
companies operate in countries with appalling human rights histories, requiring a country level 
HRIA prior to trade agreements would have beneficial implications for human rights.  In 
Guatemala and Honduras, where the Canadian and American governments have played a 
pivotal role in overthrowing democratically elected governments to secure easier access to 
both countries immense resource wealth, instituting such a policy would be a critical turning 
point for advancing human rights in both countries.   
 The Government of Canada’s response to the list of issues highlighted in the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ sixth periodic report of Canada focused on the 
mechanisms outlined in the country’s Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy which was 
updated in November 2014.128  The report references the Office of the CSR Counsellor and 
Canada’s National Contact Point, while stating that companies who refuse to participate in 
either of these mechanisms following complaints brought against them will no longer receive 
the support, or have access to the “economic diplomacy” that the Government of Canada 
provides to Canadian extractive companies operating abroad.  For example, such companies 
would no longer have access to financing by Export Development Canada (EDC), the Canadian 
Commercial Corporation nor would they receive support from Canada’s diplomatic and trade 
missions found throughout the globe.129 
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 As Amnesty International has pointed out, the absence of mandatory human rights 
standards for Canadian companies is compounded by the fact that the Government of Canada’s 
trade policies are not made parallel to the country’s international human rights obligations.130   
Honduras, as the organization explains, is a notable example. Canadian based mining 
companies finance 90 percent of all foreign investment in Honduras, which to date has resulted 
in over $600 million USD being channeled to mining concessions across the country.131  
Historically, the concentration of Canadian extractive corporations operating in Honduras 
accelerated in 2009 following a coup that deposed Honduras’ democratically elected president 
Manuel Zelaya.  Rather than publically denouncing the violent deposition of a democratically 
elected president, Canada chose to instead develop a new mining law with the new Honduran 
government aligned with Canadian corporate interests.  Efforts to change Canada’s corporate 
social responsibility landscape will inevitably be restricted unless the Government of Canada 
commits to only engaging in multilateral and bilateral trade agreements which are aligned with 
its international human rights obligations.   
In the absence of regulatory measures to monitor the international activities of mining 
companies domiciled in Canada, the government of Canada should enact legislation that 
stipulates that HRIAs are mandatory.  Such a view has also been supported by members of 
Canada’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.  In response to 
numerous allegations accusing Canadian mining companies of corporate negligence and having 
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adverse effects on the communities in which they operate in, Canada’s Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade recommended that the government: 
Put in place stronger incentives to encourage Canadian mining companies to 
conduct their activities outside of Canada in a socially and environmentally 
responsible manner and in conformity with international human rights 
standards.  Measures in this area must include making Canadian government 
support – such as export and project financing and services offered by Canadian 
missions abroad – conditional on companies meeting clearly defined corporate 
social responsibility and human rights standards, particularly through the 
mechanism of human rights impact assessments (emphasis added).132  
 
This recommendation necessarily begs the question as to who is responsible for 
financing the HRIA.  In order to be perceived as impartial, mining companies cannot be 
expected to foot the costs associated with conducting an HRIA out of fear that the findings 
would be biased towards the company commissioning the assessment or the potential for them 
to be perceived as such by local community members. To overcome perceptions of partiality, 
Oxfam’s Report titled Community Voice in Human Rights Impact Assessment recommends that 
an independent “business and human rights fund” be established in order to compensate the 
prohibitive costs of conducting a community or collaborative HRIA.133  In a similar vein, CCSI in a 
report on collaborative HRIAs recommends that home country governments or an industry 
body raise the funds necessary for a collaborative HRIA going on to add that, “Those funds 
could be managed by a neutral entity in the international sphere, and then interested 
companies and project-affected people could apply jointly for support.”134  For this to be 
effectively achieved, concerted efforts must be undertaken to reduce the power disparities and 
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informational asymmetries that exist between Indigenous peoples and extractive companies.  
In order for the informed aspect of the FPIC to be performed, it is imperative that indigenous 
communities receive the necessary financial and technical assistance necessary to be on an 
equal footing with the mining companies thereby increasing the likelihood that an effective 
participatory framework is in place.   This financial assistance must be independent so as to 
ensure that it does not influence the outcome of a FPIC process and similarly must encompass 
an array of community empowerment and capacity-building needs. 
The Government of Canada, as a home-country government where three-quarters of 
the world’s mining companies are domiciled has an important role in financing HRIAs. Canada is 
also home to several of the world’s leading mining associations and industry bodies.  For 
example, the Prospectors and Developers Association (PDAC) and the Mining Association of 
Canada could play a crucial role in encouraging Canadian mining companies to establish a HRIA 
fund.  The PDAC website states that, “With over 7,500 members around the world, our mission 
is to promote a globally responsible, vibrant and sustainable minerals industry.”135  Fostering 
the financial wherewithal from its members to support HRIAs would be the surest way for PDAC 
to bring its mission into force.  The global reach of the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICCM) also has a significant role to play in advancing HRIAs as industry best practice 
and securing the funds necessary for their implementation.  With 25 mining companies and 
over 30 national and regional associations as part of the consortium, the ICMM could also 
positively influence the uptake of HRIAs as well as develop innovative ways to produce the 
requisite resources from its members to help fund community capacity building efforts 
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necessary for collaborative or community-based HRIAs. Such funding would signal that the 
ICMM views human rights due diligence as a salient issue while simultaneously providing an 
impartial financial source for local communities who stand to be impacted from the mining 
development projects put into operation by ICMM members.  The funding source would be 
impartial in so far as not being directly linked to a particular mining company, however the fact 
the funding would be connected to a regulatory association pertaining to the mining sector 
raises important ethical questions which merit further analysis, particularly in terms of how 
such funding may unintentionally influence the outcome of an HRIA process.   
As the CCSI report notes, the extraterritorial human rights obligations of home 
governments provide a strong incentive for sponsoring a collaborative HRI.136  This support can 
take many forms such as contributions from embassies, ministries or departments of foreign 
affairs or through bilateral development agencies. In Guatemala, as in other countries across the 
globe, the deleterious impact of Canadian mining companies has shown that effective host and 
home state government oversight is lacking.  The formation of consultas across the country 
largely in response to this dereliction of duty underscores that Indigenous peoples are prepared 
to establish their own local democratic processes to ascertain community perspectives in regard 
to mining projects when companies neglect to do so.  Enacting legislation that requires Canadian 
mining companies to undertake collaborative HRIAs will ensure that project-affected people do 
not have to take responsibility for corporate acts of omission: namely the failure of companies to 
exercise a duty of care by facilitating FPIC processes and receiving the consent of Indigenous 
peoples prior to project implementation.   
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Requiring collaborative HRIAs make sense from a human rights and business 
perspective.  By means of bringing project-affected people, company representatives and other 
relevant stakeholders together to co-operatively develop and perform an assessment, 
collaborative HRIAs mitigate many of the procedural shortcomings that typically plague 
company-led HRIAs and FPIC processes.  Firstly, by facilitating collective decision-making 
processes, collaborative HRIAs allow for increased information disclosure among key 
stakeholders which helps to minimize knowledge asymmetries and in turn distrust stemming 
from a lack of transparency. Stakeholder collaboration is especially important during the 
formative stages of the assessment so as to ensure meaningful engagement by key 
stakeholders.  According to CCSI, “By ensuring that stakeholders collaborate at the initial 
scoping phase of the assessment, and by allowing shared control over relevant information and 
its use, collaborative HRIAs can incorporate more perspective and information, and enable 
more comprehensive assessments.”137 According to CCSI this can “contribute to a deeper 
understanding of each stakeholder’s perspective and priorities, help to build trust, and result in 
more effective action plans to address a project’s human rights impacts.”138  For project-
affected people, increased information sharing provides access to important information that 
likely would not have been divulged through community-based assessments alone.  This allows 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the potential impacts of the mining project as well 
as the capacity of the company to mitigate adverse risk impacts.  For mining companies, the 
involvement of community stakeholders in the assessment process provides them with a 
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platform through which to better understand project-affected people’s perceptions and 
expectations of the project and how project operations can be adapted to accommodate the 
needs of the community.    
By including community stakeholders in decision-making processes so that traditional 
power imbalances are reduced, collaborative HRIAs arguably lead to more optimal outcomes. A 
pre-condition for community stakeholders to be able to participate in an HRIA in a meaningful 
way and the likelihood that a collaborative assessment will be successful is the extent to which 
community capacity-building is undertaken.  Considering that mining companies often operate 
in rural contexts characterized by abject poverty, low education levels with minimal access to 
telecommunications and transportation networks, HRIA participants in such communities will 
require substantial preparation in terms of human rights education, training as well as skill 
development.  As such, capacity building efforts will need to focus on increasing project-
affected people’s familiarity with relevant national and international laws, working to develop 
the necessary technical and research skills for such laws to be effectively understood as well as 
negotiation and assessment skills.139  In order to address these obstacles, CCSI recommends 
that in advance of the HRIA, a systematic evaluation of capacity-building and resource needs be 
determined, followed by a plan of action aimed at addressing any inadequacies.140  CCSI also 
notes that capacity-building can also become a collective effort whereby project-affected 
people and company stakeholder combine their efforts so as to “balance each stakeholder’s 
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knowledge base while, potentially building trust between them.”141  In order to maximize the 
efficacy of a collaborative HRIA and that it reflects international law in regards to the right of 
Indigenous peoples to FPIC, ex ante HRIA should be preferable to ex post assessments.   
According to CCSI the earlier that a collaborative HRIA is conducted the higher the likelihood 
that the assessment will influence the initial development of the project and in turn result in a 
reduction of the project’s negative human rights impacts.142    
The need for collaborative HRIAs in regard to mining projects in Guatemala is further 
buttressed by the ineffectiveness and exclusionary nature of government mandated ESIAS [in 
full].  During the course of 79 interviews of various stakeholders involved in ESIAs, including 
project-affected people, municipal officials and public servants from Guatemala’s Ministries of 
Energy and Mining (MEM) and of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARN), Aguilar-
Støen and Hirsch found that ESIAs preclude meaningful community participation in decision-
making processes due to the Government of Guatemala’s lack of capacity of and mishandling of 
ESIAs.143 Additionally, the interviews revealed that the EIA processes in Guatemala suffer from a 
lack of government oversight making them susceptible to abuse.  Moreover, because mining 
companies often hire consultants to conduct ESIAs accountability is further decreased.  For 
example, Interviewees in the study recounted instances of fraudulent FPIC processes by which 
consultants asked community stakeholders to offer their signatures following an information 
session without informing them as to what their signatures represented.  The consultants were 
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then able to use the signatures as evidence that they had followed proper government protocol 
and involved project-affected people in the EIA process and thus had proof of community 
consent for the project.  Other interviewees disclosed similar examples of corruption such as 
consultants offering community leaders jobs, projects or bribes in exchange for persuading 
various community-stakeholders to grant consent for a given project.   
Most importantly, considering that at the heart of FPIC is ensuring respect for 
Indigenous Peoples right to self-determination, it is crucial that Indigenous peoples themselves 
play a central role in the definition, implementation and outlining the parameters of FPIC in 
relation to HRIAs.  In order to avert considerable delays caused by normative negotiations 
between IPs and the Canadian Government, such efforts should be informed by the work on 
UN indigenous bodies such as the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(EMPRIP) whose 11th Session in July 2018 is centered on the theme of free, prior and informed 
consent.144  The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Rights of Indigenous Peoples have also produced important publications 
on ways to further indigenous participation in decision-making processes in a way that aligns 
and reflects their right to FPIC.   
Canadian mining corporations have, for far too long, been able to act with impunity: 
using distance as a safeguard for gross violations of human rights.  The establishment of 
legislation that one, requires mining companies to put into effect HRIAs in a manner that 
operationalizes the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC and two, is inclusive of prosecutorial 
powers enabling the Canadian government to enforce corporate accountability abroad 
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including retroactively offers Canada an opportunity to transform itself from a country widely 
regarded as a safe haven for much of the world’s extractive sector to one where Canadian 
corporations respect internationally recognized human, environmental and labour standards, 
nationally as well as internationally.  The need for such legislation is confirmed with each 
cyanide spill, forced displacement of indigenous communities and assassination of human and 
lands rights defenders.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING HRIAs 
 
 
Much like other corporate governance mechanisms for promoting human rights, such as 
corporate social responsibility and multi-stakeholder initiatives, HRIAs are not invulnerable to 
abuse.  Much like the aforementioned approaches, HRIAs can also be utilized by government 
and corporate actors to further their own ulterior motives.  When government or corporate 
actors exert too much influence over the HRIA process they are liable to suffer from 
whitewashing.  In support of this Götzmann, Vanclay and Seier point out when HRIAs are 
orchestrated by governmental or business actors, the process runs the risk of becoming at best 
just another bureaucratic, tick-box exercise or at worst, nothing more than a cunning method 
to validate and legitimate particular policies or practices by appealing to human rights 
standards.145  More than anything, this point makes clear the fundamental importance of civil-
society oversight of the HRIA process.   
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Another criticism put forward by Catherine Nolin - a professor from UNBC who was 
originally commissioned to do the HRIA of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine - during a personal 
conversation is that HRIAs for all intents and purposes appear to be unjustifiably complex.  
Citing the community consultas that have taken place across Guatemala, Nolin argued that why 
should potentially affected communities, often ones with limited resources go to the effort of 
learning and facilitating a HRIA when they can convene a community meeting and simply state 
yes, or no to the proposed project.146  Moreover, Nolin argued that HRIAs appear to be 
needlessly complicated to the point of rendering them unfeasible for the very communities 
they are intended for.147 Nolin raises an important point, however she presupposes that the 
outcome of community consultas are respected by mining corporations and the national 
government.  Such insightful first impressions of HRIAs raise several important questions.  Why 
should communities go to the effort of organizing and conducting an HRIA when they can 
simply hold a community consultation and grant approval or outright reject a mining company’s 
operations from taking place on their lands and territories?  If consultas are not respected by 
neither governmental nor corporate stakeholders then what makes one think that the outcome 
of an HRIA will be?  These questions get to the heart of the impetus behind the author’s 
decision to write this thesis.   
As more and more HRIAs are performed and published, best-practices and a procedural 
baseline will slowly start to emerge making HRIAs arguably less complex.  Similarly, the 
complexity of contemporary HRIA processes is a result of the need to leave no stone unturned 
in terms of assessing and anticipating potential ways in which the process can be discredited 
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including for example on the grounds that the HRIA was incomplete, biased etc.  For that 
reason, the complexity of HRIAs as they stand today, derives from the fact that 
methodologically, HRIAs have neither been mainstreamed as a human rights due diligence nor 
have their parameters been effectively delineated from a policy and procedural perspective. 
Further, current HRIAs also need to provide corporations and government stakeholders with 
substantive documentation that can withstand external efforts of disparagement and 
invalidation.  
The author of this paper is of the view that HRIAs need to be accessible and to the 
extent possible, simplistic in order to maximize their uptake and usage by potentially-affected 
communities.  However, it goes without saying that in the pursuit of making HRIAs more 
accessible, maintaining the procedural integrity of HRIAs must remain the top priority.  The 
complexity or simplicity of a HRIA process is of course going to vary dependent on contextual 
circumstances such as the size of a potentially affected community or particular mining 
operation etc.   In any case, this isn’t to say that HRIAs should be uniform in their size and scope 
in the hopes of maximizing their accessibility as a human rights methodology but rather that 
procedurally HRIAs should not be unnecessarily complex.  The purpose of this is to ensure that 
HRIAs can be actively utilized as a pragmatic tool by indigenous and local communities to 
operationalize their right to FPIC and participatory development in a manner that is reflective 
of a human-rights based and self-determined approach to development. 
Such a belief is also supported by Dr. James Harrison, who highlights that the higher the 
complexity and stipulations of a HRIA the less likely that the process will be applied in practice 
writing that, “If HRIAs can only be utilized by a very few experts and the process of undertaking 
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them is extremely protracted, their widespread transformational potential is massively 
reduced.”148 Adding that “All of this should mean that HRIAs are a form of impact assessment 
that are more engaged with affected people than other forms of impact assessment.”149  This 
point is especially salient in countries such as Guatemala where -- the Government is not afraid 
to use coercion to forcibly evict communities from their lands and assassinate human and land-
rights defenders -- it is clear that HRIAs must be orchestrated by potentially-affected 
communities and civil society organizations in an effort to prevent the abuse of the mechanism 
by business and governmental actors.  Such collaboration will help ensure that the process is 
not plagued by unnecessary bureaucratization and lack of transparency which in turn will help 
maximize its efficacy with regard to safeguarding and strengthening human rights.    
Given the potential of HRIAs to be abused through them legitimating policies and 
practices that violate human rights, it is patently obvious that community participation and 
ownership over the HRIA process is of the utmost importance.  Participation of community 
stakeholders will maximize the utility and viability of HRIAs in protecting and promoting human 
rights by providing rights-holders with a platform to play a pivotal part in decision-making 
processes that will affect their lives.  As well, the involvement of rights-holders in HRIAs will 
ensure that human rights analysis throughout the process reflects, and is responsive to, their 
demands helping to preserve procedural integrity arguably leading to more optimal outcomes 
than HRIA processes where communities play an insignificant role.   
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Further, coordinating with international human rights organizations can help amplify the 
impact of the HRIA by virtue of such organizations disseminating the findings of the process to 
the international community as well as by acting as an eyewitness or providing protective 
accompaniment.  The ability of international human rights organizations to potentially provide 
physical and financial support to communities threatened by a particular policy, practice or 
activity has the potential to reduce the likelihood that an HRIA would face intimidation by the 
government to end the process or financial constraints stemming from the lack of financial 
support.  Writing in a similar vein, a recent report on HRIA published by the Warwick School of 
Law underscores the awareness-raising and accountability potential of HRIAs, outlining that the 
mechanism has the “potential to raise awareness about human rights issues in affected 
communities and more widely in society.  This can increase public debate around the issues 
raised and the accountability of decision-makers.”150  Therefore international human rights 
organizations committed to promoting corporate accountability should examine ways of 
accompanying or helping to build the capacity of local civil-society organizations and indigenous 
communities themselves so that they have the necessary knowledge and tools to effectively 
conduct HRIAs in a manner that clearly outlines their collective aspirations in regards to their 
right to self-determined development.  How to facilitate local capacity-building initiatives in a 
way that doesn’t entrench pre-existing power-imbalance and are devoid of paternalistic and 
patronizing undertones should be a central focus of such research.   
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Finally, the history of Canadian mining companies in committing egregious human rights 
violations abroad necessitates a concerted effort by the Government of Canada to enact a 
national action plan on business and human rights as part of its State responsibility to 
implement the UNGPs.  Canada is the only G7 country who has yet to produce or even commit 
to produce a national action plan on business and human rights.  Canada’s current policy 
approach to enforcing corporate respect for human rights has focused on responding to human 
rights violations rather than enacting legislation in an effort to prevent them.  As such, the 
Government of Canada ought to formulate and implement a public policy that outlines 
prescriptive human rights due diligence procedures that mining companies domiciled in Canada 
are required to follow which stresses the need for proactive approaches towards preventing 
human rights violations.  Considering the egregious human rights impacts that Canadian mining 
companies have on local indigenous communities in Guatemala and beyond, it is crucial that 
such a response focuses on ensuring meaningful engagement with project-affected 
stakeholders, potentially through collaborative or community-based HRIAs. This policy should 
prioritize ex-ante ahead of ex-post assessment processes given that the former has a higher 
potential to positively influence the design and implementation of a project’s due diligence 
process than the latter, leading to more optimal human rights outcomes.  Canada’s national 
action plan must also devise a strategy outlining how HRIAs and other human rights due 
diligence processes can be funded both in the immediate and long-term.  Similarly, the 
Government of Canada could examine possible ways in which the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and other government agencies can support the capacity building of Indigenous peoples 
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and local communities through human rights education and other knowledge sharing 
initiatives.  
 
Chapter Five: Conclusions and Areas for Future Research 
 
The rapes of 11 indigenous women in Loto Ocho, Guatemala prior to many of their 
homes being set ablaze, the countless assassination of indigenous leaders across the country 
and the globe, many of whom opposed the establishment of a Canadian mining operation on 
their lands and territories is what materializes when land is viewed as nothing more than a 
space from which wealth can be derived; when people located in areas of such spatial 
significance are thought of as immaterial or beneath the riches that lie in the earth underneath 
them; when the pursuit of profits takes precedent over respect for human rights; and when the 
decisions of mining executives are far removed from the local aspirations of the communities in 
which they operate.  The blockades, protests, and consultas orchestrated across much of 
Central and South America underline that there is more than just a mere disconnect between 
Indigenous communities and mining executives, but rather such forms of resistance can be 
interpreted as indicating that the two have diametrically opposed visions of development.  This 
argument is supported by Petkar, cited earlier on in this paper who attributes the failure to 
successfully implement FPIC to a divergence in perspectives and worldviews which have 
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resulted in “multiple understandings of its (FPIC) nature, its goal, and the way in which it 
functions.”151   
The disjuncture between community and company stakeholders and their dichotomous 
visions of development and FPIC to a degree was corroborated by Miguel Angel, a man 
previously mentioned in this paper whose opposition to the Marlin Mine nearly cost him his 
life.  Angel communicated that for indigenous peoples living in the community of San Miguel 
Iztahuacán, “Land is our mother, it is the honey of our lives.  It is what we live off of and use to 
survive.  This mother is our land and it is our home.  We have pride in ourselves and self-
esteem.  We know we have been dealing a lot with people who sit in their offices wearing suit 
and ties who know nothing about our lives but we get strength from other people who are 
resisting.”152  More than anything, and at the risk of a well-substantiated generalization, this 
statement makes clear that mining-affected communities feel at best ignored or irrelevant, and 
at worst, an obstacle that must be overcome at all costs in the pursuit of natural resource 
extraction by foreign mining companies. 
In an article she wrote on how transnational corporation were violating the social, 
economic and cultural rights of indigenous people, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples Victoria Lucia Tauli-Corpuz writes that, “Now that national governments are 
liberalizing laws and regulations to match WTO rules, corporations are aggressively moving into 
new communities seeking to exploit the world’s last remaining natural resources, most of which 
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are found on indigenous peoples’ lands.” 153  She goes on to state, “We have been fighting such 
exploitation for ages, so naturally, the places where the resources are left are the places where 
indigenous peoples have been the most successful in resistance.”  As this statement illustrates, 
the rise in demand for natural resources spurred by population growth and globalization will 
likely coincide with increased community resistance as more and more communities protest 
the encroachment of transnational corporations who threaten their livelihoods and in some 
cases, their lives.  Moving forward it is essential that the Government of Canada enact 
legislation that requires mining corporations to conduct human rights impact assessments 
before becoming operational.  The purpose of such assessments should be to ascertain 
whether the potential environmental and human rights impacts of the mining project justify its 
existence. And finally, considering that most of the resources mining companies are in pursuit 
of lie beneath land inhabited by indigenous peoples as Tauli-Corpuz points out, it is especially 
important the Government of Canada follow up to its commitment to implement the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in domestic legislation.  This 
includes the establishment of mandatory requirements for Canadian mining corporations to 
abide by in terms of respecting FPIC of indigenous peoples both domestically and abroad.  
This article has attempted to illustrate the various ways in which Canadian mining 
companies have capitalized on a corporate human rights framework that is based on self-
monitoring, voluntary and non-binding mechanisms while amassing huge profits at the expense 
of the rights of Indigenous peoples. The experience of Canadian mining companies in 
Guatemala showcased that current human rights due diligence processes are characterized by 
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severe informational and power asymmetries resulting in a lack of trust rendering them 
virtually useless in terms of protecting and promoting human rights.  Furthermore, despite a 
nation-wide grassroots movement leading to the establishment of consultas across the country, 
whereby Indigenous communities have asserted their right to self-determination through 
demanding that FPIC processes be a prerequisite to the implementation of mining projects in 
Guatemala, Canadian mining companies have turned a blind eye to such efforts.  In doing so the 
article aimed to highlight the importance of human rights due diligence processes which are 
more reflective of the human right principles of non-discrimination, inclusivity, transparency, 
accountability and participation.  Community-based and collaborative human rights impact 
assessments through their emphasis on collective decision-making, information sharing, local 
capacity building and increased stakeholder engagement, overcome many of the obstacles that 
affect more traditional human rights due diligence processes arguably leading to more optimal 
outcomes in terms of promoting and protecting human rights in business operations.  
By informing project-affected people of their rights and potential adverse impacts 
stemming from the implementation of a mining project as well as providing avenues for 
communication between company representatives and community stakeholders, collaborative 
and community-based HRIAs help operationalize FPIC processes.  Further, by virtue of drawing 
from international human rights frameworks, HRIAs by nature emphasize a systematic 
approach towards assessing economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights thus ensuring a 
comprehensive approach towards human rights due diligence.   In this respect, enacting 
legislation that requires HRIAs as a way to operationalize the right of indigenous peoples to 
FPIC becomes a moral imperative if Canada is to transform itself from a country widely 
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regarded as a safe haven for much of the world’s mining sector to one where Canadian mining 
corporations respect their human rights obligation as duty bearers in the regions in which they 
operate, as is expected under international human rights law.  
I opened this thesis with a quote from Arundhati Roy’s 2004 Sydney Peace Prize Lecture 
in which she reminds us, albeit implicitly, that those without a metaphorical voice are only so 
because of violence, repression and economic debilitation, often times unleashed and or 
sanctioned by the very actor tasked with the protection and promotion of human rights: the 
State.154  Later on, in her article she poses several questions including asking, “What does peace 
mean in this savage, corporatized, militarized world?  What does it mean to the millions who 
are being uprooted from their lands by dams and development projects?”  And lastly, she asks 
“What does peace mean to the poor who are being actively robbed of their resources and for 
whom everyday life is a grim battle for water, shelter, survival and, above all some semblance 
of dignity?  For them, peace is war.”  What the research included the preceding pages has made 
abundantly clear is that there is a virulent war for our planet’s resources being waged against 
Mother Earth and her First Peoples with catastrophic consequences so complete and pervasive 
that if left unchecked will unequivocally threaten the very continuation of our human 
civilization.  Our only hope at combating such an inconceivable outcome is to fundamentally 
learn from, and defend cultures in which respect for land and resource conservation is an 
integral part; a principle poignantly absent from the dominant cultures presiding over our 
planet.  A necessary prerequisite to this is a dramatic paradigm shift: one which gives 
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precedence to the empowerment and amplification of marginalized indigenous voices by 
bringing them to the forefront of decision-making processes in a way that demonstrates 
respect for their right to self-determined development.  It would neither be an overstatement 
nor a simplification to suggest that the viability of our planet depends on more participatory 
decision-making processes in which each of us, especially those most marginalized, has the 
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